Re: What ASN.1 got right

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Tue, 02 March 2021 22:19 UTC

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Subject: Re: What ASN.1 got right
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Cc: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Date: Tue, 2 Mar 2021 14:19:12 -0800
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On 3/2/21 1:38 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
>     Or skip all of this complexity and just enroll the naked public
>     key bound to whatever name you like (if any) and having the side
>     benefit of not having to deal with a dinosauric encoding scheme.
>
> https is not the same as TLS. You don't need the TLS name to be bound 
> to the domain but the https name does. And you also have to provide 
> backwards compatibility for 30 years of https browsers.


As I said, x.509 with TLS for https is water under the bridge. My point 
is that we don't need to keep thinking that they are the only way or 
even the preferred way to implement identity with asymmetric keys across 
trust boundaries, and most especially not when they are within trust 
boundaries. I've seen people get completely wrapped around the axle 
trying to shoehorn enterprise level certs and just shake my head of what 
on earth they are thinking.


>
> We looked at this approach in 1995. Really we did. And the problem is 
> that you aren't avoiding a central point of control, you are 
> pretending ICANN is that point of control. And it isn't up to that 
> role institutionally, nor is DNS suited for that purpose.

So instead we got a whole bunch of trust anchors basically by fiat. And 
business models. Lots of business models.


>
> The Mesh callsign registry is designed to support exactly that.
>
>
[]

Is this supposed to make me feel better about induced complexity?

Mike