Re: Review of draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt-09

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Fri, 07 April 2017 19:37 UTC

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Subject: Re: Review of draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt-09
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2017 21:37:25 +0200
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On 4/7/17 5:24 AM, Martin Thomson wrote:
> To the extent that we have the tools necessary to protect against pervasive
> monitoring, we have to accept that more-legitimate uses of monitoring are
> collateral[...]

... DAMAGE.

You couldn't even say the word. 

The whole point of the document is to expand upon the implications of
what operational practices are impacted in an encrypted world.  That
doesn't mean people should stop encrypting, but it does mean that we
should understand what is breaking.  To do otherwise is to stick our
heads in the sand.  Let's not do that.  And let's not question whether a
particular function is "legitimate" which ironically applies a value
judgment, something that you yourself complained about.

Better to focus on whether the impact of encryption has indeed been well
documented.

Eliot
ps: but I agree with your point about statistics.