Re: Security for various IETF services
Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com> Wed, 09 April 2014 20:16 UTC
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Subject: Re: Security for various IETF services
From: Steve Crocker <steve@shinkuro.com>
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Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2014 16:15:53 -0400
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References: <20140409154919.11E6118C106@mercury.lcs.mit.edu> <534580AF.4080602@dcrocker.net> <20140409200814.GA15303@thunk.org>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Cc: ietf@ietf.org, David Crocker <dcrocker@bbiw.net>, Noel Chiappa <jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu>
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My own opinion is related but not identical. I agree solutions 1 and 3 are failures; 1 doesn’t provide the trust and 3 doesn’t scale. Solution 2 is also problematic because the government tends to overreach and there isn’t a single government. DNSSEC provides a base platform to build upon. It doesn’t claim to provide the level of trust the CA system tried to provide. That’s a key strength, not a weakness. Steve On Apr 9, 2014, at 4:08 PM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote: > On Wed, Apr 09, 2014 at 12:17:35PM -0500, Dave Crocker wrote: >> >> The interesting premise in the suggestion is that a web of trust key >> management model is useful at Internet scale. >> >> I don't understand why anyone believes that. > > The problem is that nearly all solutions to the PKI problem I've seen > to date fall into three classes, all of which have problems (which is > why there is the oft-retold joke about how any protocol which requires > a PKI is doomed). > > 1) The current "race to the bottom" multiple competing CA model, which > while scalable, has had some rather spectacular failures, of which > Diginotar is only one example. > > 2) Trust the government to run the CA ("I'm from the government, and > I'm here to help!") --- which raises questions of "which government" > and "how do you trust that someone won't invoke 'national security' as > the root password to the Constitution / Fundamental Rights" to abuse > the trust that the government would have it served as the CA? > > 3) The PGP web of trust model, which doesn't scale to the Internet, > but which is good enough for small communities for which high trust is > extremely important (for example, such as Debian Developers and the > Linux kernel.org keyrings). > > I suspect #1 could have gotten traction as far as usage is concerned, > if the pricing model for a given level of security had been attractive > enough and if it had been sufficiently easy for mere mortals to get > x509 user certificates. But as it is, #3 has been winning out as far > as usage because the people who care enough about security to go do > the extra work are also the folks who (a) don't trust the CA's, and/or > (b) are too cheap to be willing to pay what the CA's want to charge, > and so the PGP web of trust model is quite suited for their needs. > > At the end, because the use cases and the requirements for different > communities are quite different, I think the only thing that has a > chance is some kind of hybrid solution. Because questions of format > aside, the main difference between all of these schemes is who do you > put in your trusted root, and how much cerifying delegation do you > allow? > > If you're the US military and you let the NSA handle all of your key > management needs, that's one answer. If you're a web browser, you > mark several dozen or several hundred CA's (depending on how you > count), and that's another answer. If you're a Linux kernel developer > and you want to get an account on kernel.org and be able to sign git > tags, you need to either be directly signed by one of four or five > trusted root individuals, or have 3 signatures by keys that are signed > by the root individuals, and that's yet another answer. > > What we really need is widely deployed software which can support all > of these different use cases, and deal with the fact that there is > significant base deployed that will add resistance to switching to a > whole new certificate format. (For example, x509 certs have a large > amount of infrastructure, but so do PGP --- there are smart card and > Yubikey NEO's that support storage of private keys for PGP and ssh on > hardware tokens.) And so I might want to use one of PKI policy when > validating e-mail sent by a fellow kernel developer, and use a > different PKI policy if I'm talking to a stranger someone for whom the > only authentication path is via some "race to the bottom" cerifying > authority, and where my trust requirements might be different. > > I'll note that I can mostly do that today, because my mail user agent > (mutt) supports both S/MIME and PGP. So any proposed solution should > ideally be better than what we can do today with that kind of support > (namely, adding both S/MIME and PGP into the mail client). > > Cheers, > > - Ted >
- Security for various IETF services Stephen Farrell
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- RE: Security for various IETF services Randall Gellens
- Re: Security for various IETF services Fred Baker (fred)
- RE: Security for various IETF services ned+ietf
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dave Crocker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Randall Gellens
- Re: Security for various IETF services Pranesh Prakash
- Re: Security for various IETF services Fred Baker (fred)
- Re: Security for various IETF services Douglas Otis
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services Fred Baker (fred)
- Re: Security for various IETF services Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Security for various IETF services Randy Bush
- Re: Security for various IETF services Scott Brim
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services ned+ietf
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dave Crocker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Randy Bush
- Re: Security for various IETF services Randall Gellens
- Re: Security for various IETF services Martin Rex
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services t.p.
- Re: Security for various IETF services John C Klensin
- Re: Security for various IETF services Ted Lemon
- Re: Security for various IETF services John C Klensin
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dick Franks
- Re: Security for various IETF services Hector Santos
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dick Franks
- Re: Security for various IETF services Hector Santos
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dick Franks
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services Pranesh Prakash
- Re: Security for various IETF services Martin Thomson
- Re: Security for various IETF services John C Klensin
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stewart Bryant (stbryant)
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services Hector Santos
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services ned+ietf
- Re: Security for various IETF services Tim Bray
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stephen Farrell
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dick Franks
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stephen Farrell
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services David Morris
- RE: Security for various IETF services Christian Huitema
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re[2]: Security for various IETF services mohammed serrhini
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services Randy Bush
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services S Moonesamy
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stewart Bryant
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stewart Bryant
- Re: Security for various IETF services Brian Trammell
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stewart Bryant
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stewart Bryant
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stewart Bryant
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stephen Farrell
- Re: Security for various IETF services Ted Lemon
- Re: Security for various IETF services John C Klensin
- Re: Security for various IETF services Spencer Dawkins
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stewart Bryant
- Re: Security for various IETF services Ted Lemon
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- RE: Security for various IETF services Matthew Kaufman (SKYPE)
- RE: Security for various IETF services Eric Gray
- Re: Security for various IETF services t.p.
- Re: Security for various IETF services Scott Brim
- Re: Security for various IETF services Ted Lemon
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dick Franks
- Re: Security for various IETF services Phillip Hallam-Baker
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services Yoav Nir
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stephen Farrell
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- RE: Security for various IETF services l.wood
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stephen Farrell
- Re: Security for various IETF services Yoav Nir
- Re: Security for various IETF services Noel Chiappa
- Re: Security for various IETF services Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dave Crocker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Ted Lemon
- Re: Security for various IETF services Theodore Ts'o
- Re: Security for various IETF services Tim Bray
- Re: Security for various IETF services Steve Crocker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dave Cridland
- Re: Security for various IETF services Randall Gellens
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dave Crocker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stephen Farrell
- Re: Security for various IETF services Theodore Ts'o
- Re: Security for various IETF services Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Ted Lemon
- Re: Security for various IETF services Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Security for various IETF services Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Web of trust at Internet Scale Sam Hartman
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dave Cridland
- Re: Security for various IETF services Dave Cridland
- Re: Security for various IETF services Mark Andrews
- Re: Security for various IETF services Theodore Ts'o
- Re: Security for various IETF services Jelte Jansen
- Re: Security for various IETF services Stephen Kent