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Subject: Re: [therightkey] LC comments on draft-laurie-pki-sunlight-05
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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On Feb 16, 2013, at 10:22 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> =
wrote:

> Looking at the CT proposal, it seems to me that we could fix the =
business model issue and remove a lot of the CA operational issues as =
follows:
>=20
> 1) Each browser provider that is interested in enforcing a CT =
requirement stands up a meta-notary server.
>=20
> 2) Each CA runs their own notary server and this is the only resource =
that needs to have a check in at certificate issue.
>=20
> 3) Each CA notary server checkpoints to one or more meta-notary =
servers every 60 minutes. As part of the check in process it uploads the =
whole information for all the certificates issued in that time interval.
>=20
> 4) Meta-Notaries deliver tokens that assert that the CA notaries are =
current every 60 minutes. Note here that 'current' is according to the =
criteria set by the meta notary. This is an intentional piece of 'slop' =
in the system.=20
>=20
> 5) The OCSP tokens delivered by the CA contain the information =
necessary to checkpoint the certificate to the Meta-Notaries.
>=20
> 6) A browser enforcing CT disclosure pulls a list of anchor points =
from its chosen meta-notary every 60 minutes and uses them to validate =
the CT assertions delivered in certs.

Are you saying that those six items should be added to the experimental =
RFC as requirements, or are you just discussing what might happen =
operationally after the RFC is published?=20

--Paul Hoffman=
