Coercion
S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> Tue, 26 November 2013 01:00 UTC
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Date: Mon, 25 Nov 2013 16:53:49 -0800
To: Ted Lemon <ted.lemon@nominum.com>
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
Subject: Coercion
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References: <20131125180608.55454.qmail@joyce.lan> <E5836934-317D-4E73-80CC-B8847047852A@virtualized.org> <alpine.BSF.2.00.1311251833400.57383@joyce.lan> <DCC0C5E5-A69E-4FBD-B666-BD6E58F0979D@nominum.com>
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Hi Ted, At 15:58 25-11-2013, Ted Lemon wrote: >(1) I'm not trying to impugn the good work that >was done in securing the root key. It was good >work, and I think it was very cool. I am just >asking if, despite that good work, an NSL could >get around it. It's a fair question. The >answer may be "no," or "not without it becoming >public," or "with great difficulty." I doubt >it's "easily." But it's worth asking. When >you did the root signing, we were certainly >thinking about this threat model, but it was a >bit more academic then than it is now. I think >we still had some illusions that the U.S. >government at least would choose a more >constrained attack than taking the key to >everything; we now know that the government >feels no such burden of restraintthey >apparently feel that they can be trusted with >that key, and we should be willing to provide it. In my opinion the question was a valid one. It is not clear though. I agree with Joe that it sounds like a question for ICANN. I asked some questions about the DPS previously. One of the questions was about coercion. I was okay with the response I received at that time. Regards, S. Moonesamy
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- Coercion S Moonesamy
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- Reconstruct the key S Moonesamy
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