Re: i18n requirements (was: Re: NF* (Re: PKCS#11 URI slot attributes & last call))

Jan Pechanec <jan.pechanec@oracle.com> Sun, 04 January 2015 05:58 UTC

Return-Path: <jan.pechanec@oracle.com>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC8991A6F1E; Sat, 3 Jan 2015 21:58:50 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.21
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.21 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, GB_I_LETTER=-2, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01, UNPARSEABLE_RELAY=0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DYFrAbRHafBy; Sat, 3 Jan 2015 21:58:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from aserp1040.oracle.com (aserp1040.oracle.com [141.146.126.69]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 225A51A049C; Sat, 3 Jan 2015 21:58:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from acsinet21.oracle.com (acsinet21.oracle.com [141.146.126.237]) by aserp1040.oracle.com (Sentrion-MTA-4.3.2/Sentrion-MTA-4.3.2) with ESMTP id t045wNxu028446 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=OK); Sun, 4 Jan 2015 05:58:23 GMT
Received: from aserz7022.oracle.com (aserz7022.oracle.com [141.146.126.231]) by acsinet21.oracle.com (8.14.4+Sun/8.14.4) with ESMTP id t045wJYN026420 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=FAIL); Sun, 4 Jan 2015 05:58:20 GMT
Received: from abhmp0010.oracle.com (abhmp0010.oracle.com [141.146.116.16]) by aserz7022.oracle.com (8.14.4+Sun/8.14.4) with ESMTP id t045wJsv012590; Sun, 4 Jan 2015 05:58:19 GMT
Received: from keflavik.us.oracle.com (/10.132.148.214) by default (Oracle Beehive Gateway v4.0) with ESMTP ; Sat, 03 Jan 2015 21:58:19 -0800
Date: Sat, 03 Jan 2015 21:58:17 -0800
From: Jan Pechanec <jan.pechanec@oracle.com>
X-X-Sender: jpechane@keflavik
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Subject: Re: i18n requirements (was: Re: NF* (Re: PKCS#11 URI slot attributes & last call))
In-Reply-To: <20150102030130.GN24442@localhost>
Message-ID: <alpine.GSO.2.00.1501032124490.6923@keflavik>
References: <CAK3OfOgm_ZYj-rY+4ExZzY8KY4G3rz2KLrZ8hQJi7ZUR4yiP0Q@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.GSO.2.00.1412300946340.4549@keflavik> <CAK3OfOha9qu=uDtqwDTdV78waLMaorYq0T6cq1YX3VzQn2OpKA@mail.gmail.com> <A4CC6CEC-D17E-4235-B615-9D2AD88096D4@frobbit.se> <20141231070328.GK24442@localhost> <B08B813F-B8B4-49F1-A0B9-60F322C8E9C7@frobbit.se> <20141231074641.GM24442@localhost> <947CA101-D717-4B56-8EEE-84B3A53BF4A1@frobbit.se> <20141231082551.GN24442@localhost> <E4837FDB76D5ACDEB1C568DF@[192.168.1.128]> <20150102030130.GN24442@localhost>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.00 (GSO 1167 2008-08-23)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: MULTIPART/MIXED; BOUNDARY="-559023410-586517042-1420350762=:6923"
Content-ID: <alpine.GSO.2.00.1501032152480.6923@keflavik>
X-Source-IP: acsinet21.oracle.com [141.146.126.237]
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/f96x6QY7dZGhcZgrABsWw2Eo3sc
Cc: Darren J Moffat <Darren.Moffat@oracle.com>, ietf@ietf.org, Patrik Fältström <paf@frobbit.se>, Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@oracle.com>, saag@ietf.org, John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 04 Jan 2015 05:58:51 -0000

On Thu, 1 Jan 2015, Nico Williams wrote:

	Nico, many thanks for the drafted text and also to Patrik and 
John for discussing it.

	I've updated the draft in sections on URI matching guidelines,
URI comparision, added a new section on I18n, and added a new paragraph
to the Security considerations.  Individial diffs inline, a draft for
new draft 18 attached (draft-pechanec-pkcs11uri-18-v1.txt).

>I think we could use some text like this:
>
>   PKCS#11 does not specify a canonical from for UTF-8 string slots in
>   the API.  This presents the usual false negative and false positive
>   (aliasing) concerns that arise when dealing with unnormalized
>   strings.  Because all PKCS#11 items are local and local security is
>   assumed, these concerns are mainly about usability.
>
>   In order to improve the user experience, applications that create
>   PKCS#11 objects or otherwise label tokens, SHOULD normalize labels to
>   NFC.  For the same reason PKCS#11 libraries, slots (token readers),
>   and tokens SHOULD normalize their names to NFC.  When listing
>   libraries, slots, tokens, or objects, an application SHOULD normalize
>   their names to NFC.  When matching PKCS#11 URIs to libraries, slots,
>   tokens, and/or objects, applications may use form-insensitive Unicode
>   string comparison for matching, as the objects might pre-date these
>   recommendations).

	I've created "Internationalization Considerations" section and 
put the text above there after I slightly modified it.  I wanted to
mention CK_UTF8CHAR type so that it's clear what is discussed.

768	6.  Internationalization Considerations

770	   The PKCS#11 specification does not specify a canonical form for
771	   strings of characters of the CK_UTF8CHAR type.  This presents the
772	   usual false negative and false positive (aliasing) concerns that
773	   arise when dealing with unnormalized strings.  Because all PKCS#11
774	   items are local and local security is assumed, these concerns are
775	   mainly about usability.

777	   In order to improve the user experience, applications that create
778	   PKCS#11 objects or label tokens, SHOULD normalize labels to NFC.  For
779	   the same reason PKCS#11 libraries, slots (token readers), and tokens
780	   SHOULD normalize their names to NFC.  When listing PKCS#11 libraries,
781	   slots, tokens, and/or objects, an application SHOULD normalize their
782	   names to NFC.  When matching PKCS#11 URIs to libraries, slots,
783	   tokens, and/or objects, applications MAY use form-insensitive Unicode
784	   string comparison for matching, as those might pre-date these
785	   recommendations.  See also Section 3.5.

	in section 3.5 on URI Matching Guidelines, I've added the
following as the last paragraph of the section (it was based on John's
note from his last email).  This paragraph might not be necessary there
and the first part could be moved to the I18N section but I think it's
good to put it to where attribute matching is discussed so that it is
not easily overlooked.

513	   As noted in Section 6, the PKCS#11 specification is not clear about
514	   how to normalize UTF-8 encoded Unicode characters [RFC2279].  Those
515	   who discover a need to use characters outside the ASCII repertoire
516	   should be cautious, conservative, and expend extra effort to be sure
517	   they know what they are doing and that failure to do so may create
518	   both operational and security risks.  It means that when matching
519	   UTF-8 string based attributes (see Table 1) with such characters,
520	   normalizing all UTF-8 strings before string comparison may be the
521	   only safe approach.  For example, for objects (keys) it means that
522	   PKCS#11 attribute search template would only contain attributes that
523	   are not UTF-8 strings and another pass through returned objects is
524	   then needed for UTF-8 string comparison after the normalization is
525	   applied.

>Then later in the security considerations section, add something like:
>
>   PKCS#11 does not authenticate devices to users; PKCS#11 only
>   authenticates users to tokens.  Instead, local and physical security
>   are demanded: the user must be in possession of their tokens, and
>   system into whose slots the users' tokens are inserted must be
>   secure.  As a result, the usual security considerations regarding
>   normalization do not arise.  For the same reason, confusable script
>   issues also do not arise.  Nonetheless, it is best to normalize to
>   NFC all strings appearing in PKCS#11 API elements.

	I've added the following to the Security Considerations 
section (again, slightly modified, I'd rather not use "PKCS#11" as 
an alias for the specification):

807	   The PKCS#11 specification does not provide means to authenticate
808	   devices to users; it only allows to authenticate users to tokens.
809	   Instead, local and physical security are demanded: the user must be
810	   in possession of their tokens, and system into whose slots the users'
811	   tokens are inserted must be secure.  As a result, the usual security
812	   considerations regarding normalization do not arise.  For the same
813	   reason, confusable script issues also do not arise.  Nonetheless, it
814	   is best to normalize to NFC all strings appearing in PKCS#11 API
815	   elements.  See also Section 6.

	on top of that, I've added the following sentence to 3.6. PKCS#11 URI
Comparison section:

532	   strictly avoiding false positives.  When working with UTF-8 strings
533	   with characters outside the ASCII character sets, see important
534	   caveats in Section 3.5 and Section 6.

	the attribute Table 1 now also states which attributes are 
UTF-8 strings so that it's clear without consulting the spec.

	thank you, Jan.

-- 
Jan Pechanec <jan.pechanec@oracle.com>