Re: Quic: the elephant in the room

Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com> Sat, 10 April 2021 18:13 UTC

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Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
To: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Cc: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
References: <3b25c77d-e721-e86d-6c34-a90039aab0e2@mtcc.com> <CAMm+Lwhi8xwFgZJL7jod2g4urZt_f+dm0tNi+3y1osqOfch2mQ@mail.gmail.com> <3593a01f-73f4-7d03-a85b-dff64a8b070e@mtcc.com> <CABrd9STZXonBDvWB7Z36H2mD20Juubc01TUmEvpfWkvJggQVOQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
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Date: Sat, 10 Apr 2021 11:13:23 -0700
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On 4/10/21 2:29 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, 10 Apr 2021 at 00:35, Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com 
> <mailto:mike@mtcc.com>> wrote:
>
>
>     On 4/9/21 4:26 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>>     It is only a 'three packet handshake' if you ignore the off path
>>     interactions with the DNS service. The timeout on DNS tens to be
>>     rather smaller than that most would be comfortable with for crypto.
>
>     I don't see why it can't be long lived, but even normal TTL's
>     would get amortized over a lot of connections. Right now with
>     certs it is a 5 message affair which cannot get better. But that
>     is why one of $BROWSERVENDORS doing an experiment would be helpful.
>
>
> When I was designing Certificate Transparency, Chrome ruled out any 
> side channel communications requirement during handshake. Given that 
> DNS is required anyway, perhaps this would be different.


It occurs to me that it would be possible to return the DANE RR's as 
additional RR's in the address query so that it is always the case that 
it is in cache for the sake of the handshake. Or it could possibly be 
the other way around: you query for the DANE RR and get back A/AAAA 
records as well. I don't know how this might work in real life, but it 
seems theoretically possible. That would satisfy the no "side channel" rule.

Mike