Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 21 August 2014 16:14 UTC
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Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 16:13:59 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
To: ietf@ietf.org, saag <saag@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more prominent (Re: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03 preview for comment)
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On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 11:35:26AM -0400, Stephen Kent wrote: > >Near as I can tell there are no remaining substantive objections to > >Viktor's draft, only ones related to wordsmithing, writing style, and > >the name we'll give to this concept. All of these are a flavor of > >bikeshedding. We should stop arguing about such things, make just one > >more small effort to adjust Viktor's prose, and publish. > > I agree that we seem to have settled on a small set of design principles. Thanks. > I continue to disagree with your assertion that clear, concise wording > is a not an important aspect of this task. Whether the -03 was adequate, or inadequate, I agree that much of the proposed text in the abstract and introduction is an improvement, ... Thanks a lot for the text! [ Wish it were XML, and not extracted from "Word" and sent as HTML, but that's something I managed to get past with help from lynx and Perl... ] I'm working on integrating the improved bits, but keeping more of the original *content* in place (reworked). In deleting the "Pattern" section and compressing the "Principles" section, too much was lost in the proposed revision. So that's where my efforts will be spent, recreating that content with more clarity and less repetition. Still working on it, ... -- Viktor.
- Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be more… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Paul Wouters
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Dave Crocker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Scott Kitterman
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Christian Huitema
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … l.wood
- Re: Adept Encryption: Was: [saag] DANE should be … Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag]: Review of: Opportunistic Security -03… Paul Wouters
- Re: [saag] : Review of: Opportunistic Security -0… Stephen Kent
- Re: [saag] Adept Encryption: Was: DANE should be … Stephen Kent
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Theodore Ts'o
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Nico Williams
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Bernard Aboba
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Michael StJohns
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Dave Crocker
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… joel jaeggli
- Re: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Fernando Gont
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Mark Andrews
- Re: [saag] Is traffic analysis really a target (w… Henry B (Hank) Hotz, CISSP
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Ted Hardie
- RE: [saag] Is opportunistic unauthenticated encry… Hosnieh Rafiee
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Brian E Carpenter
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Nico Williams
- Re: Is traffic analysis really a target (was Re: … Eric Burger