Re: The TCP and UDP checksum algorithm may soon need updating

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 08 June 2020 17:22 UTC

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Date: Mon, 8 Jun 2020 12:21:48 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>
Cc: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: The TCP and UDP checksum algorithm may soon need updating
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On Mon, Jun 08, 2020 at 09:59:19AM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
> On 6/8/20 2:09 AM, Nick Hilliard wrote:
> > Michael Thomas wrote on 08/06/2020 01:21:
> > in their current incarnations, transport mode ipsec and tcp-ao aren't
> > deployable at scale in the same way that tls is.
>
> why would you say that? what layer the crypto is performed seems sort of
> irrelevant: rsa, aes and sha don't care who calls them. i assume that you
> can hack ipsec to emulate clients not having certs. what's left?

TLS is trivial to deploy: change your apps.

IPsec has no notion of "connections" -- well, there's RFC5660, but that
basically never got implemented (I suppose it's never too late) -- so
it's hard to apply.

TCP-AO requires an out of band key exchange mechanism which I guess
could be IKE, but is that implemented?

> > Regarding transport layer integrity, there are distant echoes of the old
> > circuit-switched vs packet-switched arguments going on here.  tcp/ip
> > made circuit switching redundant by loosening its assumptions about
> > transport layer reliability.  I wonder are we now seeing something
> > similar with TLS, which no longer depends on either underlying transport
> > or ip header integrity by pushing data stream integrity management
> > higher up the stack.
> 
> Quic seems to have done the opposite by moving it down. But do I trust
> higher levels to deal with congestion avoidance correctly? Not at all.
> That's a tragedy of the commons waiting to melt down.

Eh?  No, QUIC / HTTP/3 switches to UDP, but integrity protection happens
at the application layer, not at the UDP or IP (IPsec) layers.

I do expect UDP-based Internet protocols to handle congestion avoidance.

Nico
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