Re: https at ietf.org
Thiago Marinello <thiago@marinello.eng.br> Wed, 06 November 2013 12:03 UTC
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From: Thiago Marinello <thiago@marinello.eng.br>
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2013 10:02:39 -0200
Message-ID: <CAPzJMbV73ATJLDTojh9SmPoqDoNYw6=d_SYc0b+iQnbR_06fYA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: https at ietf.org
To: Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net>
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Cc: IETF-Discussion Discussion <ietf@ietf.org>, Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com>
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I have no problem with additional access via HTTPS, IETF already have it. It is better to have more ways to deliver content. The interested party has the freedom to choose the best way to access, HTTPS, HTTP, FTP, anything. If the issue is privacy for those who access, HTTPS can help partially, they do not intercept the documents that the person reads, but still be able to know that there was a connection to the computer with the IP address of the IETF. But if the problem is to ensure the integrity of documents (RFCs) I suggest that the RFC Editor digitally sign each published RFC (using GPG), thus making it possible to check if the document has not been altered during communication or storage. Sincerely, __ Thiago Marinello +55 19 9248 0860 On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 9:39 AM, Dave Cridland <dave@cridland.net> wrote: > On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 11:28 AM, Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com>wrote: > >> How does the use of HTTPS restrict who can participate in the IETF? That >> is like saying that because we no longer offer Gopher, we have closed off >> participation to some (possibly null) set of Internet users. >> >> If we do not encourage the use of our own work, why should anyone else >> use it? >> >> > Requiring HTTPS, particularly with reasonable cipher suites, might > restrict use of from certain jurisdictions. > > Allowing HTTPS, on the other hand, does not. Unfortunately, because of the > nature of HTTP/HTTPS, we cannot perform opportunistic encryption in the > same way as with the mail and XMPP services we use. > > >> On Nov 5, 2013, at 10:41 PM, ned+ietf@mauve.mrochek.com wrote: >> >> > This is, or is supposed to be, an open standards body, one that is >> > trying to encourage as many qualified people as possible to participate. >> > It makes no sense at all to restrict access in this way. >> >> >
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org David Morris
- Re: https at ietf.org Paul Wouters
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Dean Willis
- Re: https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org Hector Santos
- Re: https at ietf.org Marco Davids (Prive)
- Re: https at ietf.org Hector Santos
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Yoav Nir
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org Thiago Marinello
- Re: https at ietf.org Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: https at ietf.org John C Klensin
- Re: https at ietf.org John C Klensin
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- authentication without https (was Re: https at ie… Dave Crocker
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: authentication without https (was Re: https a… Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org MAISONNEUVE, JULIEN (JULIEN)
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- Re: https at ietf.org Marco Davids (Prive)
- Re: https at ietf.org Yoav Nir
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Carsten Bormann
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Carsten Bormann
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org t.p.
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Arturo Servin
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Noel Chiappa
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org Chris Inacio
- Re: https at ietf.org Noel Chiappa
- Re: https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Yoav Nir
- Re: https at ietf.org t.p.
- Re: https at ietf.org Noel Chiappa
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Chris Inacio
- Re: https at ietf.org Martin Rex
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Martin Rex
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Douglas Otis
- Re: https at ietf.org Pranesh Prakash
- Re: https at ietf.org Pranesh Prakash
- Re: https at ietf.org Martin Rex
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org John R Levine
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Coercion S Moonesamy
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org John Levine
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Michael Richardson
- Reconstruct the key S Moonesamy
- Re: https at ietf.org Randy Bush
- Re: https at ietf.org Randy Bush
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Sean Turner
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: [IETF] https at ietf.org Warren Kumari
- Re: [IETF] https at ietf.org Michael Richardson
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org Mark Andrews
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org John C Klensin
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org Douglas Otis