Re: ietf.org unaccessible for Tor users

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Wed, 16 March 2016 18:55 UTC

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Subject: Re: ietf.org unaccessible for Tor users
To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
References: <20160313143521.GC26841@Hirasawa> <m2a8m0y72q.wl%randy@psg.com> <F04B3B85-6B14-43BA-9A21-FC0A31E79065@piuha.net> <56E7E09D.7040100@cisco.com> <4349AFDD-350C-4217-9BEE-3DBD2F608F95@nohats.ca> <27177.1458050662@obiwan.sandelman.ca> <m2k2l3qud5.wl%randy@psg.com> <56E90304.3050407@cisco.com> <m2bn6eq59r.wl%randy@psg.com> <56E904A7.80200@cisco.com> <m2a8lyq4ud.wl%randy@psg.com> <56E90BF9.4090306@cisco.com>
From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 13:55:31 -0500
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Cc: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>, IETF Disgust List <ietf@ietf.org>
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On 3/16/16 2:32 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> To my knowledge nobody else has raised the concern that that
> the Tor people are raising, and so we are being asked to specifically
> support Tor.  Fine.  That means we then need to consider the
> benefit/harm of our actions regarding who precisely we are helping.  I
> asked that question honestly without an answer, but with concerns.

It's a little off topic, but I'll bite. I'm only replying in the hope 
that we can get past the sidelong aspersions that imply that these users 
are somehow undeserving of access.

This FAQ gives information in a far more thoughtful and comprehensive 
way than I could have hoped to regarding the users who make use of the 
TOR network: https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en

One of the less obvious things, though, is that switching back and forth 
between Tor and normal browsing on the same machine opens you up to 
certain fingerprinting attacks (cf. 
https://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/unsanctioned-tracking/#limitations-of-technical-solutions). 
These attacks can allow determined adversaries to correlate your 
"regular" traffic with your Tor-routed traffic. These are mostly 
state-level actors, although some non-state institutions have 
demonstrated the ability to unmask Tor traffic using this class of 
technique.

So, in particular, the people you're blocking when you make Tor access 
impossible or difficult, are frequently going to be the ones who risk 
persecution, imprisonment, or death if they're discovered. Think human 
rights activists, citizen journalists, and anonymous whistleblowers in 
oppressive regimes. They're the ones who literally *cannot* afford to 
turn Tor off.

/a