Re: https at ietf.org

Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com> Wed, 06 November 2013 02:29 UTC

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Subject: Re: https at ietf.org
From: Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>
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Date: Tue, 05 Nov 2013 20:29:21 -0600
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On Nov 5, 2013, at 7:35 PM, David Morris <dwm@xpasc.com> wrote:

> 
> I don't see reason to use https for delivery of public documents such
> as RFCs and Internet Drafts. All that would really accomplish is
> reduce caching opportunities.

For regimes that insist on capturing encrypted data, it certainly increases the work factor.

For regimes that suspect all users of encrypted data are opponents, it should also have a salubrious effect.

—
Dean