Re: https at ietf.org
Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com> Wed, 06 November 2013 02:29 UTC
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Subject: Re: https at ietf.org
From: Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>
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Date: Tue, 05 Nov 2013 20:29:21 -0600
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References: <CAHBU6ivbrk=NXgd4_5Upik+8H0AbHRy3kJnN=8fcK+Bz3pOV9Q@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.LRH.2.01.1311051733570.4200@egate.xpasc.com>
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On Nov 5, 2013, at 7:35 PM, David Morris <dwm@xpasc.com> wrote: > > I don't see reason to use https for delivery of public documents such > as RFCs and Internet Drafts. All that would really accomplish is > reduce caching opportunities. For regimes that insist on capturing encrypted data, it certainly increases the work factor. For regimes that suspect all users of encrypted data are opponents, it should also have a salubrious effect. — Dean
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org David Morris
- Re: https at ietf.org Paul Wouters
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Dean Willis
- Re: https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org Hector Santos
- Re: https at ietf.org Marco Davids (Prive)
- Re: https at ietf.org Hector Santos
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Yoav Nir
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org Thiago Marinello
- Re: https at ietf.org Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: https at ietf.org John C Klensin
- Re: https at ietf.org John C Klensin
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- authentication without https (was Re: https at ie… Dave Crocker
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: authentication without https (was Re: https a… Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org MAISONNEUVE, JULIEN (JULIEN)
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- Re: https at ietf.org Marco Davids (Prive)
- Re: https at ietf.org Yoav Nir
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Carsten Bormann
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Carsten Bormann
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org t.p.
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Arturo Servin
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Noel Chiappa
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org Chris Inacio
- Re: https at ietf.org Noel Chiappa
- Re: https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Tim Bray
- Re: https at ietf.org Yoav Nir
- Re: https at ietf.org t.p.
- Re: https at ietf.org Noel Chiappa
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Chris Inacio
- Re: https at ietf.org Martin Rex
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org ned+ietf
- Re: https at ietf.org Martin Rex
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Måns Nilsson
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Douglas Otis
- Re: https at ietf.org Pranesh Prakash
- Re: https at ietf.org Pranesh Prakash
- Re: https at ietf.org Martin Rex
- Re: https at ietf.org Dave Cridland
- Re: https at ietf.org John R Levine
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Eric Burger
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Coercion S Moonesamy
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Ted Lemon
- Re: https at ietf.org John Levine
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Michael Richardson
- Reconstruct the key S Moonesamy
- Re: https at ietf.org Randy Bush
- Re: https at ietf.org Randy Bush
- Re: https at ietf.org Joe Abley
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Sean Turner
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: [IETF] https at ietf.org Warren Kumari
- Re: [IETF] https at ietf.org Michael Richardson
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org David Conrad
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org Mark Andrews
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org John C Klensin
- Re: https at ietf.org Doug Barton
- Re: https at ietf.org Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: https at ietf.org Douglas Otis