Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-lamps-eai-addresses-05.txt> (Internationalized Email Addresses in X.509 certificates) to Proposed Standard

[Viktor Dukhovni <[e-mail]>]

> On Feb 28, 2017, at 6:11 AM, Wei Chuang <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
>> Given that rfc822Name is a well-known legacy element, while SmtpUtf8Name
>> is a novel element, the prescription can be asymmetric.  Specifically,
>> all that's really needed (in the simpler model proposed by John) is
>> to disallow SmtpUtf8Name altnames when (only) rfc822Name constraints
>> are present.
>> 
>> The converse is not required, a parent CA that is SmtpUtf8Name aware
>> and wants to issue a child CA with SmtpUtf8Name constraints can and
>> should also include appropriate rfc822Name constraints that ensure
>> that the desired SmtpUtf8Name constraints are not bypassed via
>> unauthorized rfc822Name altnames.
>> 
>> The rfc822Name constraints can either permit only equivalent domain
>> names (LDH or A-label forms), or, if no rfc822Name can be compatible
>> with the SmtpUtf8Name constraints, permit only something like
>> "[e-mail]", thereby excluding all valid rfc822 addresses.
> 
> Apologies about being pedantic.  If we specify the CA name constraints as you describe above with the asymmetric requirements on SmtpUtf8Name, are you okay with the draft's position on keeping separate name constraint processing for rfc822Name and SmtpUtf8Name types?  In other words the above is proposed to be the resolution for the issue raised in your email Feb 11th, second email, para 1-3 i.e. preventing evasion of name constraints.  

Works for me.

-- 
	Viktor.