Re: [GROW] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-grow-large-communities-usage-06

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Wed, 19 April 2017 08:55 UTC

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Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2017 17:55:07 +0900
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
To: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>
Cc: Job Snijders <job@instituut.net>, gen-art@ietf.org, draft-ietf-grow-large-communities-usage.all@ietf.org, grow@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [GROW] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-grow-large-communities-usage-06
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>> you're supposed to guess
>> 
>> the normal hack here is
>> 
>>    this document introduces no new security issues beyond those discussed
>>    in 1997
> 
> Guessing is horrible, but if that is what you do, that is what you do,
> and if the risks are the accepted norm in the BGP community I am fine.

i meant that, instead of being specific, you left it to the authors to
guess what you wanted.

> Is corruption (deliberate or otherwise) of the community strings
> something that BGPsec will address?

no.  bgpsec does not sign over communities.  this is because hops may
validly remove them, thus invalidating signatures.

randy