Re: https at ietf.org

ned+ietf@mauve.mrochek.com Thu, 07 November 2013 19:19 UTC

Return-Path: <ned+ietf@mauve.mrochek.com>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6483011E8264 for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:19:30 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.574
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.574 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.025, BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id fzU0RKC9FZIN for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:19:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mauve.mrochek.com (mauve.mrochek.com [66.59.230.40]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id CFCF811E8281 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:19:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from dkim-sign.mauve.mrochek.com by mauve.mrochek.com (PMDF V6.1-1 #35243) id <01P0I4SQNLAO0007FY@mauve.mrochek.com> for ietf@ietf.org; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:16:16 -0800 (PST)
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET="iso-8859-1"
Received: from mauve.mrochek.com by mauve.mrochek.com (PMDF V6.1-1 #35243) id <01P0DS85DTO000004G@mauve.mrochek.com> (original mail from NED@mauve.mrochek.com) for ietf@ietf.org; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:16:13 -0800 (PST)
From: ned+ietf@mauve.mrochek.com
Message-id: <01P0I4SPB6W800004G@mauve.mrochek.com>
Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2013 11:10:57 -0800
Subject: Re: https at ietf.org
In-reply-to: "Your message dated Thu, 07 Nov 2013 12:19:00 -0500 (EST)" <20131107171900.B41DE18C0E2@mercury.lcs.mit.edu>
References: <20131107171900.B41DE18C0E2@mercury.lcs.mit.edu>
To: jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu
Cc: ietf@ietf.org, jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2013 19:19:30 -0000

>     > From: ned+ietf@mauve.mrochek.com

>     > In light of the sentiments expressed at the plenary and in perpass in
>     > regards to opportunistic encryptions, perhaps this is the dogfood we
>     > should be eating.

> Yes, encrypting publicly available documents will do so much to increase our
> privacy.

;-)

> Look, I've got nothing against increasing privacy, but encrypting everything
> is neither a privacy panacea, nor without costs/hassles.

I agree 100%.

> E.g. Wikipedia now insists on sending me to HTTPS: versions of _all_ their
> pages (I guess to protect against a MITM corrupting the content - since the
> content is totally public, I can't figure out what else good they think it
> does - although HTTPS doesn't really do that good a job at that).

Insisting on encryption != opportunistic encryption. And yes, if they require
it, that's bad for exactly the same reasons it would be bad for the IETF to do
so.

> Problem is
> that for one of my browsers, it somehow can't get the certificates right, so
> every time I go to Wikipedia I get a zillion pop-ups complaining about
> certificate problems. Irony is, of course, that in some counties the whole
> site is just plain totally blocked.

Exactly right. But if we can do it in a way that causes those with the ability
to upgrade to an encrypted connection to do so, that's not a bad thing.

				Ned