Re: https at ietf.org

David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org> Thu, 07 November 2013 19:25 UTC

Return-Path: <drc@virtualized.org>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4872811E8282 for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:25:08 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.599
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.599 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id OxdZA6dMxlpJ for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:25:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from alpha.virtualized.org (alpha.virtualized.org [199.233.229.186]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8432E11E8281 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 11:25:03 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by alpha.virtualized.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2289862CB; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 14:25:01 -0500 (EST)
Received: from alpha.virtualized.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (alpha.virtualized.org [127.0.0.1]) (maiad, port 10024) with ESMTP id 38052-07; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 14:25:01 -0500 (EST)
Received: from dhcp-b08a.meeting.ietf.org (dhcp-b08a.meeting.ietf.org [31.133.176.138]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: drc@virtualized.org) by alpha.virtualized.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 37002862CA; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 14:25:01 -0500 (EST)
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="Apple-Mail=_F3B6E335-CF22-4BE1-B383-608933E7C9A6"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha1"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.6 \(1510\))
Subject: Re: https at ietf.org
From: David Conrad <drc@virtualized.org>
In-Reply-To: <20131107183500.4698B18C0D6@mercury.lcs.mit.edu>
Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2013 11:24:59 -0800
Message-Id: <5494C1D8-A61D-47C1-AA12-DD87112F68B0@virtualized.org>
References: <20131107183500.4698B18C0D6@mercury.lcs.mit.edu>
To: Noel Chiappa <jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1510)
Cc: ietf@ietf.org
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2013 19:25:08 -0000

Noel,

On Nov 7, 2013, at 10:35 AM, Noel Chiappa <jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu> wrote:
> Forcing everyone who uses Wikipedia (or the IETF web sites) to use HTTPS may
> make people feel good, and/or serve as an expression of outrage at widespread
> surveillance, but I'm not sure it's much more than that.

I believe the idea is that in the face of pervasive surveillance, one response is pervasive encryption. If we're going to go down the road of pervasive encryption, then we're going to need to make encryption as fool proof and transparent as possible. Forcing HTTPS may be one (minor) way to focus attention on making encryption easier.

Regards,
-drc