Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality

Michael Thomas <> Mon, 12 April 2021 23:21 UTC

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Subject: Re: DNSSEC architecture vs reality
To: Nico Williams <>
References: <> <> <> <> <> <> <20210412221435.GV9612@localhost> <> <20210412222748.GW9612@localhost> <> <20210412231850.GA9612@localhost>
From: Michael Thomas <>
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Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 16:21:39 -0700
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On 4/12/21 4:18 PM, Nico Williams wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 12, 2021 at 03:43:31PM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
>> The one thing that bugs me about DANE is its use of a native RR type. This
>> is a well trodden argument of doing it proper and doing it in a deployable
>> way. We know what happens when you do it the "right way" which is usually
>> nothing at all. If it started to get popular, we could gin up a TXT record
>> alternative though, I suppose. When we were doing DKIM at Cisco, our IT
>> folks were incredibly accommodating, but implementing a new RR type in their
>> infrastructure would have probably been a bridge too far. Heck, I wouldn't
>> be surprised if Mark at Y! got told the same thing :)
> Hmm, well, as they say, "new RR types are cheap", though more
> importantly document authors get forced to use new RR types rather than
> use TXT RRs.  But tooling for hosting sites and such is a problem, yes,
> even if it isn't for servers and clients.  But this is water under the
> bridge now.  And if anything, the IETF is tripling down on more new RR
> types.

Maybe somebody should take score of the new RR's vs. deployment. Data is 
our friend.