Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA

Lucy Lynch <llynch@civil-tongue.net> Fri, 06 September 2013 00:46 UTC

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Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 17:46:07 -0700
From: Lucy Lynch <llynch@civil-tongue.net>
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To: Dean Willis <dean.willis@softarmor.com>
Subject: Re: Bruce Schneier's Proposal to dedicate November meeting to saving the Internet from the NSA
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On Thu, 5 Sep 2013, Dean Willis wrote:

>
> This is bigger than the "perpass" list.
>
> I suggested that the surveillance/broken crypto challenge represents "damage to the Internet". I'm not the only one thinking that way.

an additional call to action can be found here:

http://www.newamerica.net/pressroom/2013/statement_oti_statement_on_new_leaks_of_nsa_defeating_encryption_technology_3

"In the interim, technologists need to take a hard look at how to 
reengineer the Internet to avoid this type of massive undermining of our 
privacy rights. Our current trajectory is toward a more fractured, less 
safe Internet, and only major, meaningful reforms will restore trust and 
prevent even more detrimental outcomes."

> I'd like to share the challenge raised by Bruce Schneier in:
>
> http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/05/government-betrayed-internet-nsa-spying
>
>
> To quote:
>
> -----------
> We need to know how exactly how the NSA and other agencies are subverting routers, switches, the internet backbone, encryption technologies and cloud systems. I already have five stories from people like you, and I've just started collecting. I want 50. There's safety in numbers, and this form of civil disobedience is the moral thing to do.
>
> Two, we can design. We need to figure out how to re-engineer the internet to prevent this kind of wholesale spying. We need new techniques to prevent communications intermediaries from leaking private information.
>
> We can make surveillance expensive again. In particular, we need open protocols, open implementations, open systems – these will be harder for the NSA to subvert.
>
> The Internet Engineering Task Force, the group that defines the standards that make the internet run, has a meeting planned for early November in Vancouver. This group needs dedicate its next meeting to this task. This is an emergency, and demands an emergency response.
> ------------
>
> The gauntlet is in our face. What are we going to do about it?
>
>
> --
> Dean Willis