Re: Quic: the elephant in the room

Ben Laurie <benl@google.com> Sun, 11 April 2021 22:18 UTC

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From: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Apr 2021 23:18:39 +0100
Message-ID: <CABrd9SShpOnSpshnMZSag4ZVp6ic5tURFoH9RzT0WCXDHyxgkA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Quic: the elephant in the room
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On Sun, 11 Apr 2021 at 17:00, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

> On Sun, Apr 11, 2021 at 03:34:06PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> > What I mean is that the authorities for DNS get compromised far more
> often
> > than CAs do.
>
> But any compromise of a registrant, registrar or registry also
> compromises CA certificate issuance.  The CAs are redundant so
> long as the attestation they're performing is "domain control".
>

CT makes that untrue. Why is this not obvious?


>
> > Also, DNS has the same plethora of authorities with varying
> > security responsibility.
>
> Choose a security-conscious registrar, and apply registrar lock, and any
> other available/applicable options to prevent unauthorised changes to
> domain registration metadata.
>

Of course anyone can trivially figure this out. Not.