Re: [Ila] [5gangip] ILA forwaring [Was Re: Problem Statement]

["FIGURELLE, TERRY F" <[e-mail]>]

When you need to manage how usage is rated that plays a big role in how packets are handled. There it makes a whole lot of difference how the 3GPP policy rules are built. All 3GPP operators of significance do this and where you discard packets makes a huge difference. If you intentionally discard packets that have already been metered it is illegal in some countries.

But let’s take this back to where it began.

SPOOFING:

1. I’ve checked and NR edge can be or is covered by RAN (some RAN doesn’t exist yet). Thus it’s not possible for a UE to spoof IP addresses because the RAN can protect the upstream. It is already protected today by SGW/PGW and UPF.

You can also protect for 3GPP RAN and WiFi via ePDG by installing a policy rule. The rule has the valid subnet/prefix for the UE in the 5-Tuple. There is actually short hand in rule definitions which just substitutes the UE IP/subnet when it gets to PGW (before flowing down to RAN and UE).

2. EDGE use cases require tight coordination all the way down to transport to meet requirements. This includes definition of address ranges to be used in both directions exchanged between all parties involved. We actually have to go into great detail to make sure specific protocols can work. This also requires non-default CoS/QoS treatment which requires 3-tuple knowledge before the first packet. Thus we must know the flow before even the first packet is sent. Since you know what is valid, it trivial to block at the services edge what isn’t valid.

FYI

VoLTE smartphone requires a proxy on the general purpose APN. I checked and none of the vendors have or are working on a proxy that can get an unexpected SYN from services edge.

This is true for CGNAT too. You need some form of NAT traversal and these all require a packet up to get things plumbed.

Sent from my iPhone

On May 9, 2018, at 8:21 AM, Tom Herbert <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 8:08 AM, Tom Herbert <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
On Tue, May 8, 2018 at 10:48 AM, FIGURELLE, TERRY F <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:
Nope, we handle QUIC. Spent lots of time with Google on that one. Many

Terry,

QUIC was only an example. I'm am concerned with the next QUIC, next
real time gaming protocol, next application protocol that might
benefit from a different transport. There's no reason to believe that
QUIC and TCP constitutent the complete set of transport protocols that
we'll ever need and that those are the only ones we should be allowed
to use on the Internet. NATPT and proxies enforce their concept as to
what transport protocols are allowed. Proxies introduce the addional
complexity in that they make it harder to deploy new options and make
it impossible to use end to end transport header authentication.

This is why protocols like ILA are explicitily independent of
transport layer. They don't require DPI, they don't require flow state
to be tracked in the network, and they don't require packets of a flow
to always hit the same devices in the network. They can however solve
problems at the network layer (the aforementioned privacy in
addressing for example).


I should also mention that blocking unsoliticted traffic and providing
flow specific services are still relevant, but these can also be done
in a transport independent manner. See FAST proposal
(draft-herbert-fast-00).

Tom

Tom


people here have worked at T-Mobile USA and the flip. T-Mo USA does block
unsolicited but this gets deep into the details of unsolicited and fine
lines of block or do not support or enable it to happen.

T-Mobile by country does have differences. They got a lot more address space
from RIPE than T-Mo USA got from ARIN. So in the states they use NAPT. They
do support NAT traversal but do not host TURN. If the T-Mo USA and Sprint
deal goes through they will have some huge challenges to efficiently combine
things.

They also use the exact same SGW/PGW vendor and hardware model as we do. So
does Verizon (Cisco ASR5500). They may still have some of the older ASR5000
and Verizon may too. Neither has a virtualized solution in production. We
have both Cisco and Affirmed carrying live paying production traffic. We
stopped adding hardware based solutions more than a year ago. We also have
virtualized MME (Ericsson) since last year and Nokia is in certification
testing. We have virtualize most of the IMS domain and mobility systems
except RAN. We are working on RAN.

We are using CUPS for launch of 5G this year. Still debating the options
longer term but we also need standards to make decisions.

Back to unsolicited.

We all support methods so traffic flows like video chat can work but key is
we all work directly with those ASP’s (Application service providers). All
of us have special handling of traffic to Amazon, Apple, Google and so on.
The difference is in the functionality, scale and number of ASP’s support
where we smoke everyone!

So you can build an App for Apple iOS or Google’s Android and it can work
well. You can also do peer-to-peer but only as long as the setup goes thru
servers that are enabled. In our case you could also use our API’s. Mobile
to mobile is only allowed when enabled.

While unsolicited is the common term used in the mobile industry perhaps
unwanted or undesired gives a better view. User’s don’t want SPAM and they
don’t want threats (risk of device being compromised). But if they download
and setup an App they do want that to work.

It also gets to the definition of Internet. In the US very little mobile
traffic ever goes over the “Internet”. It’s all protected private networks
between mobile operators and data centers. Even inside the data centers the
traffic uses servers dedicated to mobile users. Within the data center it
may go from mobile servers to non-mobile servers.

We also have major hosting companies and cloud providers covered. A startup
may rent capacity from Amazon but mobile traffic goes over a protected
(encrypted) path on a private network to Amazon data centers worldwide. Same
for most major hosting facilities worldwide.

This is true for most mobile operators and often even when they don’t know
it. There are some places where things are different like China. Everyone
does what they are told to do in China or you won’t be in China. Lots of
complicated partnerships to make anything work. So your traffic is visible
to some parties when there is no other option.

All of the big CDN solutions and CDN supplies work with this model. So
Akamai for Verizon mobiles is different from Akamai on AT&T mobiles. In our
case this only goes to Akamai servers in AT&T hosting facilities. So for all
of the major mobile operators in the entire Western Hemisphere. In reality
it’s true for all mobile operators in Western Hemisphere to any significant
service even when they don’t know it. It doesn’t matter who is the local LEC
or what ISP the mobile operator uses.

We even protect open WiFi and I wanted to protect all mobile “Internet
services traffic” but that is in the future. We detect if a VPN is in use or
if one starts to stay out of the way in the current open WiFi case. We can
split and run traffic from UE over one VPN while running tethered (mobile
hotspot, USB, Bluetooth) traffic outside the VPN or in a different VPN. We
even support corporate VPN so the traffic actually goes over private network
to corporate servers instead of coming in their “Internet” connection.

You may ask about ISP peering points but in those cases for partnered
content we use encryption. A company could use Level3 as an ISP then serve
Internet content on that connection. If we don’t have a partnership deal
with that company then traffic would be protected to our closest to content
peering point with Level3.

Another way to say it is for the top X websites by clicks/hits, top Y sites
by volume (bytes) or top Z sites by connection for the busiest hour, busy
period, day of week, etc. for any operator you can draw a line. Above that
line the traffic is secured mobile to/from content. Below the line it may be
secured or it may not.

The rules for handling the Internet in a given country can be very complex.
In many countries you can count on one or two fingers your options as a
mobile operator when they are not THE LEC/ISP.

Sent from my iPhone

On May 8, 2018, at 7:44 AM, Tom Herbert <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:



On Tue, May 8, 2018 at 6:39 AM, Lorenzo Colitti <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

FWIW, I believe there are large operators that do not block unsolicited
inbound traffic to mobile networks. One of them is T-Mobile.

I should hope that a majority of access networks don't do that, lest it
would be impossible to deploy new transport protocols (like QUIC for
instance) and the ossification of the Internet would be complete.

Tom

On Fri, May 4, 2018 at 7:53 AM, FIGURELLE, TERRY F <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

No. We have always block unsolicited traffic from the Internet and it is
too complicated to discuss here.

We even did this way back for CDPD. For dedicated APN's we allow the
enterprise to tell us what rules they want to protect the mobile from their
network and what traffic to not allow from the mobile. This is one of the
reasons firewalls and CNAT cost more if they support mobility features. We
spent a lot of time working with potential vendors.

Since this started with usage based rate plans for all mobile operators
the subscriber would get charged if we allowed spam from the Internet or
from other mobiles. So this has always been block and vendors have features
to help out in 3GPP elements. A GGSN with anti-spoofing not disabled doesn't
allow traffic to a mobile that doesn't match an entry in the flow table. We
have hundreds of policy rules that get enabled from the PCRF/PCF on the
PGW(PCEF)/UPF. We also enabled our proxies to be transparent proxy-TDF. That
means they also have policy interfaces and we do a bunch of stuff here
including processing signed manifests. Plus the rules are pushed on the
control plane not the data plane and it includes UE, RAN, SGW/PGW/UPF and if
applicable TDF's and AS's. We can push rules to the UE that allow, (drop),
route/path (e.g. bearer). We even have to have some country specific
treatment (a bigger challenge we had for vehicles using our Connected Car
solution like GM OnStar).

While a mobile could get hacked and it could break the flow rule
treatment some of that is down in the 3GPP chipset. But we are aware of the
risk and we have counter measures as best we can. I should point out that
these flow rules go into RAN too and rules have a direction (from UE, to UE
or both).

My opinion is that malware, spoofing, DOS, DDOS and any other threat is a
serious operational issue. That is the best place to deal with it because
standards could never keep pace. We and other operators request features
from vendors and they also come up with stuff as a value add.

Simply stated the solution needs to be protected but we don't need tons
of detail in every standard.

I would never say don't be concerned about something. I just don't think
every standard needs details on spoofing, DOS and other threats.


-----Original Message-----
From: Tom Herbert <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2018 3:00 PM
To: Joel M. Halpern <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: FIGURELLE, TERRY F <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>; Tom
Herbert <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>; Alberto Rodriguez-Natal
<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; 5GANGIP <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [5gangip] [Ila] ILA forwaring [Was Re: Problem Statement]

On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 2:45 PM, Joel M. Halpern <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
wrote:
I am missing something in your DDOS issue.

At first, I thought the real issue (which you seem to be suggesting
here) was DDOS from the Internet, using spoofed or non-spoofed
addresses (with bot farms, there is much less need for or relevance
of
spoofing).

But then I tried to map it to the cases we have for using ILA.
The primary case I have heard about is to use ILA for UE<->UE and
UE<->EdgeComputing traffic.  If so, just filter all SIRs on incoming
packets from the Internet.  They aren't legal there.  And similarly,
if one uses LISP within the operator domain, we can block whatever
blocks we use for EIDs for such local traffic.

Joel,

I'm not sure I understand what "filtering SIRs from the Internet"
means. A SIR address is a globally visible address for devices like
UEs. So an
Internet sender may legitimately send packets to SIR addresses, and
also an
Internet attacker could easily spew a whole bunch of packets with both
spoofed
source addresses and spoofed UE addresses. So you'd want to allow the
legitimate traffic but block the attacking packets-- this isn't
feasible since it's
impossible to distinguish the bad from the good packets.


If we want to use id-locator split of any kind for handling traffic
to
/ from the Internet, then we have to understand how that is supposed
to work, and why, before we need to evaluate DDOS implications of a
solution.  For LISP,the working group has explicitly said that
Inter-wide deployment is out of scope.

Net: I do not see in currently described deployments, an issue that
differentiates LISP from ILA in these regards.  And Terry has very
clearly spelled out that for mobile operators spoofing from UEs is
not
considered an issue that the infrastructure needs to deal wih.

But there may be a whole network infrastructure of hundreds or even
thousands of users behind a UE, and there's no guarantee that that
infrastructure properly supports anti-spoofing. This basically this
case has the
same problem as in the Internet case.

Tom


Yours,
Joel


On 5/3/18 5:33 PM, Tom Herbert wrote:

On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 2:23 PM, FIGURELLE, TERRY F <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
wrote:

In the case of current 3GPP operators all the major vendors support
anti-spoofing. The default was on for all but one vendor which got
corrected the last time I did an RFP for EPC. So by configuration
the GGSN/PGW/PGW-U/UPF will not allow  the UE to send packets that
don't match either the exact IP address or pushed subnet or prefix
delegation that was sent in response to the APN create message.
Obviously if we remove GTP encapsulation that protect MAY need to
be
enhanced towards an EDGE element.

Terry,

Even so, the whole Internet does not require anti-spoofing, nor do I
believe that operators could require all down stream network that
are
connected to support anti-spoofing. These are where the DOS attacks
orginate. The problem is when caches are being driven by user taffic
from these external networks, mitigations to detect DOS by IP source
address don't work without anti-spoofing (but even if they had
anti-spoofing that still doesn't work when under a DDOS).

Tom



This is being covered as part of our participation in an open
source
vEPC (virtualize EPC, hypervisor, blah, blah, blah). So there will
be a micro service firewall that can be deploy at the edge plus we
already have planned support for big network infrastructure vendors
and 3GPP supplies (Cisco, Juniper, Ericsson, Nokia, Huawei, ...) to
cover this. Since this can  be a non-3GPP element we will get this
into
ONAP.

Thus we have this covered both for 3GPP nodes, micro services and
open source efforts. To give examples without vendor names there
are
GTP aware firewalls that some operators use. It really just another
capability in carrier class and business class firewalls (had to
add
it to load balancers, CNAT/NAT, some Wi-Fi routers and to our DNS
solution which uses open source).  Obviously this will be supported
via a RADIUS feed for backwards compatibility. Today most GTP
firewall simply follow the GTP-C signaling to learn the IP
address(es) assigned to the UE for an APN. If we remove GTP from
user plane that doesn't mean we remove it from control plane or for
all hops. However, we will likely push to a micro service at the
cell plus I need to check if we ever ask RAN vendors to support
this. I'll add
this for 5G but we already did that RFP so it's a change order (yuck).

I am not good at wordsmithing but I suggest there be some paragraph
that covers network elements that can except a RADIUS feed. I need
to talk to our standards team to see if we want this on T8
(probably).

So today for all AT&T, Verizon, Vodaphone,  ..... I know or am
fairly confident they have anti spoofing tuned on in the
GGSN/PGW/UPF plus I know they can turn this on per APN. Not sure
why
anyone would disable this since we if you are delegating a subnet
to
a Wi-Fi hotspot (instead of the typical private addressing they
use).

We actually don't need any 3GPP changes since this is already
covered using RADIUS to pass the information where it needs to go.
I
suspect most will leverage their caching SPR/UDR which already has
the information. Even the GGSN we launched EDGE/GPRS when I was
much
younger supported anti-spoofing and many vendors cover this via a
number of methods (e.g. COPS works for older junos and RADIUS for
Cisco
IOS releases ).

My suggestion is that I am willing to help whoever wants to craft
the paragraph because I suck at that (fortunately I am good at
other
things).

I don't think we need any changes to any standards to cover this
since we already cover this and already are covering this if we
strip out GTP (at least for one leg). I'll make sure it gets into
our RAN requirements if not there since that may be the best place
for that edge. Plus I'll get it covered thru the ONAP open source
effort we drove (we donated the software to the open source
effort).
That means FM, PM, CM and IM will be covered in some future ONAP
release (takes time but faster than 3GPP).

It's a bit debatable what is RAN when using virtualized network
functions
(VNF) and a bunch of open source stuff that we put it into all of
the needed elements like SDN, firewall, load balancer (not sure
that's needed at cell site but it is for core DNS, proxy-TDF and
CNAT) out at the cell site. We aren't there yet (still physical
eNB/NR and obviously we need hardware assist even with
virtualization plus tight control of timing). I am looking forward
to when we
start using containers.

For our core I am sure we will use our UDR VNF as the cache for
whatever comes out of this effort in final standards. The
information is already there (IMEI, device vendor, subscription
information, UE IP address, APN, etc.). If we do anything it would
be to augment an open source and if needed a 3GPP. I don't think we
need
any changes but it's always best to verify.
For current RAN an anti-spoofing feature would come from EMS which
can be via ONAP. I don't think that is a standards effort thing
since it's a feature which may or may not already be covered but it
will be in future RAN releases probably starting with eNB/NR with
some vendor release if it's not already a feature. I want to say
Ericsson and Nokia already can do this in eNB but I need to go thru
channels to ask.

So maybe that paragraph recommends implementing anti-spoofing at
all
edges and leaves it at that. Or we could say all edges including
RAN
if that makes people happy.

-----Original Message-----
From: 5gangip <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> On Behalf Of Tom Herbert
Sent: Thursday, May 03, 2018 10:46 AM
To: [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>
Cc: Tom Herbert <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; Joel M. Halpern
<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>; Alberto Rodriguez-Natal
<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; 5GANGIP <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [5gangip] [Ila] ILA forwaring [Was Re: Problem
Statement]

On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 9:23 AM,  <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:

Hi Tom,
I understand you correctly that DDOS attacks can never be
completely

prevented whatever protocol you use.

It will however always remain related to known IP addresses and
the more

versatile these are handled a mitigation strategy could be
designed.

Dirk,

I disagree. IP addresses can too easily be spoofed, it's easy to
hide identity behind a NAT (see discussion about CGNAT and law
enforcement on int-area list), and trying to turn off individual
addresses doesn't work if it's a DDOS. This is nothing new. For
instance, content providers have long accepted the fact that they
can't prevent SYN attacks and there's little point to trying to go
back to source IP address (they are always spoofed in a SYN
attack). The better strategy is to absorb the attack and minimize
the negative effects so that the attack is not worth the effort.

As you may have seen we mention improved handling of mapping
systems

and subsequently of DDOS protection also in the current version of
our PS document https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-
3A__github.com_bsarikaya_atic_blob_master_atick-
5Fproblemstatement.3.txt&d=DwICAg&c=LFYZ-

o9_HUMeMTSQicvjIg&r=tO_sNxa2NTxwl2paJIf4zw&m=zYkPItjuHMuGlJXD5K_4
OstVOL1OQiA98fgBJ9c1Gjo&s=jLL_9a56R8Ic8o3uJcR8mrF-
JkzLL97h8rmZT_EqXnQ&e=  which Behcet has announced recently.

May I ask you to please comment on the ideas outlined there?


I don't see much difference in the latest version. For a problem
statement, I still think there is too much focus on the solutions
and not nearly enough description of what the actual problems are
to be solved.

Tom

Thanks!


Best Regards
Dirk

-----Original Message-----
From: 5gangip [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Tom
Herbert
Sent: Mittwoch, 2. Mai 2018 01:20
To: Joel M. Halpern <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Cc: Tom Herbert <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; [e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>; Alberto
Rodriguez-Natal <[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>; 5GANGIP
<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>
Subject: Re: [5gangip] [Ila] ILA forwaring [Was Re: Problem
Statement]

On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 3:49 PM, Joel M. Halpern
<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>

wrote:

You seem to be saying that even though not all DDOS attacks are
structurally the same, and even though if ILA were widely
adopted
not all ILA networks would be structurally the same, there
should
nonetheless be one required qay of handling DDOS?


Yes, at least as core default in the protocol. It's precisely
_because_ not all

DDOS attacks are structurally the same. An attacker is not going
to
conform to to our expectations of what they should be doing, so if
we enable LISP option N to mitigate one form of attack, they will
just use another attack that isn't mitigated. For example, if the
mitigation is to identify attackers by address when requests from
the address exceed a threshold then this works as long as the
attacker strikes from one machine, but it falls apart if the
attacker launches a DDOS attack from several hosts where requests
from none of the hosts exceed the threshold.


The ILA model works because it assumes there is no absolute way
to
prevent

the the worst case attack on a cache which is to completely kill
it
(i.e. drive it to 0% hit rate). In this state the behavior
sub-optimal routing, which is much better than loss of service.
This is not dependent on the structure of the attack, network
topology, or the network operator getting the configuration just
right--
it is inherent in the protocol.


Tom


Yours,
Joel


On 5/1/18 6:32 PM, Tom Herbert wrote:


On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 2:59 PM, Alberto Rodriguez-Natal
<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>> wrote:


On Tue, May 1, 2018 at 10:16 AM, Tom Herbert
<[e-mail]<mailto:[e-mail]>>

wrote:



I think you've misunderstood my position. Caches are _very_
important to eliminate the cost triangular routing (latency,
average path

load).

This reduces latency and reduces average load on ILA-Rs. But,
and
this is the critical part, caches are only an _optimization_
in
ILA. That means if the cache is rendered ineffective (like by
a
well crafted DOS
attack) then the only effect is that the optimization is loss
(i.e.
greater latency due to triangular router)-- this is
quantitively
the worst effect of the attack on an ILA cache. This can be
contrasted that to LISP where the worst case effects of a DOS
attack on the cache is loss of service for users (infinite
latency
since packets can be dropped or indefinitely blocked on a
cache
miss).




This can be misleading. This is not comparing LISP vs ILA,
this is
comparing the models of Request/Reply at the edge vs
Notifications
(aka Redirects) at the core. Both LISP-CP and ILAMP support
these
two models.

Besides, this is assuming an scenario where the only feasible
DOS
mitigation is absorbing the attack. There are other scenarios
where
other countermeasures are possible. For instance, if you have
a
deployment where you can prevent address spoofing, counting
and
blocking misbehaving nodes offers similar DOS protection and
requires way less infrastructure resources.

Alberto,

The answer to my question of how does LISP address DOS attacks
seems
to be "there are many options". Some of the options are to
assume
that DOS does not exist in the network, some assume external
configuration like address spoofing is enabled, some assume
that
attacks can be identified and can be stopped at the source,
some
might assume that everything is okay because there's never been
a
DOS attack before. I have yet to see the effects of any of
these
quantified, and none of these state how the LISP _protocol_
itself
addresses DOS. It may seem counter-intuitive, but offering a
bunch
of options really is not necessarily a good thing-- sometime
less is
more. To put this another way LISP has been rejected from Linux
precisely because of its susceptibility to DOS. If you were to
try
again and the best answer to the DOS question is that it's up
to the
operator to figure out the right options to use, then I believe
it
would be soundly rejected again. That approach does not work at
scale.

Tom

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