Re: [Ila] [5gangip] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt

Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Tue, 03 July 2018 15:15 UTC

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From: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net>
Date: Tue, 03 Jul 2018 08:14:58 -0700
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To: Jon Crowcroft <jon.crowcroft@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Cc: Erik Nordmark <nordmark@acm.org>, 5GANGIP <5gangip@ietf.org>, ila@ietf.org, "lisp@ietf.org list" <lisp@ietf.org>, dmm <dmm@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Ila] [5gangip] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt
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On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 10:01 PM, Jon Crowcroft
<jon.crowcroft@cl.cam.ac.uk> wrote:
> what we need is compact onion routing - maybe we could call it garlic routing.
>
> in all seriousness, if people are worried about privacy with regards
> network operators, or state actors co-ercing network operators, at
> this level, that is what you want. otherwise forget about efficient
> mobile routing - the fact is that the signature of the set of
> locations you visit is enough to re-identify a node pretty quickly -
> its been done (see wetherall's work on this a few years back on simply
> looking at sequences of wifi AP associations, without bothing with end
> system mac addr, to uniquely matc individual (indeed, find their home)
> - you have to get the threat model appropriately...and proportioately

Jon,

The threat is not limited to coming from network operators, it is
basically from the whole Internet. IP addresses must be sent as clear
text, and when they encode personally identifiable information then
that can be used by third parties to compromise privacy. In mobile
addresses, the threat is both comprising identity and location of the
user. Identity can be compromised when the same address (or device
specific prefix in case of RFC4941 addresses) is reused for different
flows, location is compromised when an address encodes a locator that
can be used to determine specific location. There are publicized
examples of third parties using IP addresses to expose identity and
location (e.g. https://theintercept.com/2018/03/26/facebook-data-ice-immigration/).

In order to provide privacy in addressing, IP addresses need to be
purged of PII. This likely entails minimizing aggregation and a high
frequency of address change in a host. On the surface, this does seem
to be in conflict with "efficient mobile routing" as you mentioned,
however I don't believe that efficient routing is an acceptable trade
off for not providing adequate privacy to users. Alternatives that
achieve both goals should be investigated.
draft-herbert-ipv6-prefix-address-privacy-00 suggests "hidden
aggregation" as one possibility.

Tom

>
> On Mon, Jul 2, 2018 at 11:42 PM, Erik Nordmark <nordmark@acm.org> wrote:
>>
>> This is a rough draft, but hopefully it can stimulate more discussion around
>> privacy considerations.
>>
>> -------- Forwarded Message --------
>> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt
>> Date: Mon, 02 Jul 2018 15:34:11 -0700
>> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
>> To: Erik Nordmark <nordmark@sonic.net>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Erik Nordmark and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name:           draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy
>> Revision:       00
>> Title:          Privacy issues in ID/locator separation systems
>> Document date:  2018-07-02
>> Group:          Individual Submission
>> Pages:          6
>> URL:
>> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00.txt
>> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy/
>> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy-00
>> Htmlized:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nordmark-id-loc-privacy
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    There exists several protocols and proposals for identifier/locator
>>    split which have some form of control plane by which participating
>>    nodes can use to share their current id to locator information with
>>    their peers.  This document explores some of the privacy
>>    considerations for such a system.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
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