[Ilc] Internet-Level Consensus bar BoF tonight 7:30pm, Amuse

David Mazieres <dm-list-ietf-ilc@scs.stanford.edu> Thu, 30 March 2017 18:46 UTC

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From: David Mazieres <dm-list-ietf-ilc@scs.stanford.edu>
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Subject: [Ilc] Internet-Level Consensus bar BoF tonight 7:30pm, Amuse
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For those interested in further discussion of Internet-level Consensus
(ILC) following my talk at the SAAG open meeting, let's meet at 7:30pm
at Amuse, the bar inside Swissotel right near the lobby.

David

David Mazieres <dm-list-ietf-ilc@scs.stanford.edu> writes:

> I'll be giving the following 30-minute talk during the saag session at
> the upcoming IETF meeting in Chicago, likely followed by a "bar bof" on
> Internet-level consensus that evening.
>
>
> 		Internet-Level Consensus is Practical
>
> 			    David Mazières
>
> 		      Security Area Open Meeting
> 		 Thursday March 30, 2017 15:20-17:20
> 			    Zurich D room
> 				   
> Consensus is the problem of agreeing on a valid input value among
> members of a distributed system.  Internet-level consensus extends the
> concept to global agreement, despite the fact that the Internet has no
> meaningful notion of membership.  This talk will report on the Stellar
> consensus protocol (SCP), an existence proof that secure consensus
> does not require well-defined membership.  SCP's key idea is for
> individual participants to decide for themselves which other
> participants they cannot afford to diverge from.  SCP guarantees
> agreement so long as there is transitive overlap in these
> dependencies.  SCP is in production use by the Stellar payment
> network, but has broader potential applications ranging from secure
> package distribution to key management in end-to-end email encryption.