Re: [Insipid] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-insipid-logme-marking-12: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com> Mon, 13 August 2018 21:33 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
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Date: Mon, 13 Aug 2018 16:33:27 -0500
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Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-insipid-logme-marking@ietf.org, insipid@ietf.org, gsalguei@cisco.com, insipid-chairs@ietf.org
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [Insipid] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-insipid-logme-marking-12: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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> On Aug 13, 2018, at 3:41 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; wrote:
> 
> S 6.4.2.
>>     store all the SIP messages that are exchanged within a given dialog.
>>     SIP messages can contain the personal identifiers listed in
>>     Section 6.4.1 and additionally a user identity, calling party number,
>>     IP address, hostname, and other user and device related items.  The
>>     SIP message bodies describe the kind of session being set up by the
>>     identified end user and device.
> 
> This seems to have extremely negative consequences when security
> descriptions is used. It seems like you need to prohibit their
> combination or at least call this out.
> 

Oh, that’s a really good point; thanks for catching it :-)

Authors:  Security Descriptions [RFC 4568] typically includes SRTP keys directly in the SIP SDP bodies. SRTP keys _really_ shouldn’t show up in logs, at least without extreme caution. (probably not even then.)

A specific prohibition seems reasonable,  or at least some scary-strong guidance.

Thanks!

Ben.