Re: [Int-area] [ietf-privacy] NAT Reveal / Host Identifiers

[<[e-mail]>]

Re-,

Please see inline.

Cheers,
Med

>-----Message d'origine-----
>De : ietf-privacy [mailto:[e-mail]] De la part de
>Stephen Farrell
>Envoyé : samedi 7 juin 2014 15:21
>À : Dan Wing
>Cc : [e-mail]; Internet Area; Joe Touch
>Objet : Re: [ietf-privacy] [Int-area] NAT Reveal / Host Identifiers
>
>
>Hi Dan,
>
>On 07/06/14 02:38, Dan Wing wrote:
>>
>> Stephen,
>>
>> It seems NAPT has become IETF's privacy feature of 2014 because
>> multiple users are sharing one identifier (IP address and presumably
>> randomized ports [RFC6056], although many NAPT deployments use
>> address ranges because of fear of compressing log files).  As a
>> former co-chair of BEHAVE it is refreshing to see the IETF embracing
>> NAPT as a desirable feature.
>
>Embracing seems like significant overstatement to me, but maybe
>that's understandable given how calmly NAT is generally debated.
>
>NATs have both good and bad properties. The slightly better privacy
>is one of the good ones.
>
>Recognising that reality is neither embracing nor refreshing IMO,
>nor does it mean NAPT is (un)desirable overall. (That's an argument
>I only ever watch from the side-lines thanks:-)
>
>> However, if NAPT provides privacy and NAT Reveal removes it, where
>> does that leave a host's IPv6 source address with respect to BCP188?
>>
>> Afterall, an IPv6 address is quite traceable, even with IPv6 privacy
>> addresses (especially as IPv6 privacy addresses are currently
>> deployed which only obtain a new IPv6 privacy address every 24 hours
>> or when attaching to a new network).  If BCP188 does not prevent
>> deployment of IPv6, I would like to understand the additional privacy
>> leakage of IPv4+NAT+NAT_Reveal compared to the privacy leakage of
>> IPv6+privacy_address.
>
>I'm frankly amazed that that's not crystal clear to anyone who
>has read all 2.5 non-boilerplate pages of the BCP. Or even just
>the last two words of the 1-line abstract (hint: those say "where
>possible.")
>
>Yes, source addresses leak information that affects privacy. But
>we do not have a practical way to mitigate that. So therefore
>BCP188 does not call for doing stupid stuff, nor for new laws of
>physics (unlike -04 of the draft we're discussing;-)

[Med] FWIW, this draft does not hint solutions but it aims to describe scenarios with problems. I understand you have concerns with privacy but this is not an excuse to abuse and characterize this effort as "stupid". Privacy implications should be assess on a per use case basis (see for example cases where all involved entities belong to same administrative entity). Furthermore, the document (including -04) says the following : "the document does not elaborate whether explicit authentication is enabled or not."

>
>Adding new identifiers with privacy impact, as proposed here, is
>quite different.

[Med] I have already clarified this point: the scenario draft does not propose any identifier!

>
>S.
>
>PS: If someone wants to propose what they think is a practical
>way to mitigate the privacy issues with source addresses, please
>write a draft first and then start a separate thread somewhere.
>
>
>>
>> -d
>>
>
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