[Int-area] stateless firewalls in draft-ietf-intarea-frag-fragile-08

Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Fri, 01 February 2019 16:37 UTC

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From: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Date: Fri, 01 Feb 2019 08:37:01 -0800
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Subject: [Int-area] stateless firewalls in draft-ietf-intarea-frag-fragile-08
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Hello,

I have a couple of comments regarding the text about stateless firewalls.

>From the Section 4.3:
"Because port information is not available in the trailing fragments
the firewall is limited to the following options:

   o  Accept all trailing fragments, possibly admitting certain
classes of attack.

   o  Block all trailing fragments, possibly blocking legitimate traffic."

There seems to be a third option described in RFC1858.

"Fortunately, we do not need to remove all fragments of an offending
packet. Since "interesting" packet information is contained in the
headers at the beginning, filters are generally applied only to the
first fragment.  Non-first fragments are passed without filtering,
because it will be impossible for the destination host to complete
reassembly of the packet if the first fragment is missing, and
therefore the entire packet will be discarded."

>From the section 4.6 of the draft:

"A stateless firewall cannot protect against the overlapping fragment attack."

Isn't this addressed in RFC1858 and RFC5722? (e.g.  "4.2 Prevention of
the Overlapping Fragment Attack" is a section in RFC1858).

Tom