[Internetgovtech] Policy aspects (was: Cross community)

S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> Tue, 22 July 2014 18:23 UTC

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Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 10:48:02 -0700
To: John Curran <jcurran@istaff.org>, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl@gih.com>
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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Cc: internetgovtech@iab.org, Avri Doria <avri@acm.org>
Subject: [Internetgovtech] Policy aspects (was: Cross community)
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Hi John,

This comment is unrelated to the transition.

At 18:03 21-07-2014, John Curran wrote:
>created out of that process.  I guess if the  IETF were to make a
>habit of embedding social policy aspects into its protocol design,
>one could argue that its processes and accountability mechanisms
>become a valid item to review, but the IETF hasn't historically
>been embedding public policy values into its protocol designs...

During discussions about protocol design there are instances where 
the line between the technical aspects and the other aspects not that 
clear.  As an example, I posted a review of a BCP at 
My personal experience is that it is becoming difficult to determine 
whether I am straying too far away from the technical aspects during 
discussions about surveillance.

There was an IETF discussion yesterday about an IETF technology and 
Africa.  Someone argued [1] that security is not considered as a high 
priority in Africa and that it makes sense to do have intermediaries 
in between the servers and the users.  There are technical benefits 
for having intermediaries.  This is where a person would have to 
decide whether it is appropriate, as part of the design, to allow 
interception in the protocol.

S. Moonesamy

1. I did not catch the exact words and I could be misinterpreting 
what was said.