IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [Iot-onboarding] OPC and BRSKI

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Thu, 08 August 2019 15:47 UTC

Return-Path: <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
X-Original-To: iot-onboarding@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: iot-onboarding@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 195C21201D7; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 08:47:16 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -4.199
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.199 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-2.3, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id gjuEayODWZU8; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 08:47:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [209.87.249.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 452DF12019D; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 08:47:14 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from sandelman.ca (unknown [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:2:56b2:3ff:fe0b:d84]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 648103818F; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 11:46:34 -0400 (EDT)
Received: from localhost (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 96014CC; Thu, 8 Aug 2019 11:47:12 -0400 (EDT)
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: "Randy Armstrong (OPC)" <randy.armstrong@opcfoundation.org>, "iot-onboarding@ietf.org" <iot-onboarding@ietf.org>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <BYAPR08MB490385B1BED4C665C79B1937FAD70@BYAPR08MB4903.namprd08.prod.outlook.com>
References: <BYAPR08MB4903F02A37ED9AE092A59B8EFAD50@BYAPR08MB4903.namprd08.prod.outlook.com> <649C8221-5F33-4EC2-8E03-3EEAF4CAAB64@cisco.com> <BYAPR08MB4903129ECDEADF61E681DE0BFAD50@BYAPR08MB4903.namprd08.prod.outlook.com> <46BF5F7B-5407-45A9-9C4F-EA553DF5814B@cisco.com> <11781.1565189957@localhost> <20190807172252.4sadxaiprm6hhmdy@faui48f.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> <BYAPR08MB490385B1BED4C665C79B1937FAD70@BYAPR08MB4903.namprd08.prod.outlook.com>
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.7+dev; GNU Emacs 24.5.1
X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m<nPbLgmtKK-5dC@#:k
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2019 11:47:12 -0400
Message-ID: <4671.1565279232@localhost>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/iot-onboarding/-RWyUvanX0l-1WcosZdJ3bOkhNg>
Subject: Re: [Iot-onboarding] OPC and BRSKI
X-BeenThere: iot-onboarding@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of IoT onboarding mechanisms <iot-onboarding.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/iot-onboarding>, <mailto:iot-onboarding-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/iot-onboarding/>
List-Post: <mailto:iot-onboarding@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:iot-onboarding-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/iot-onboarding>, <mailto:iot-onboarding-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2019 15:47:16 -0000

Randy Armstrong (OPC) <randy.armstrong@opcfoundation.org> wrote:
    >> Thats what i referred to in my prior email: We would need to understand how to most easily duplicate the mutual authentication with certificates during TLS connection setup with OPC TCP UA messages.:

    > OPC UA CP requires mutual authentication with Certificates bound to the
    > application rather than the machine. It provides everything that you
    > get from TLS.

Based upon my reading of the diagram, it is not obvious that it provides
PFS, but I don't think PFS is particularly important for BRSKI.  It seems
to support client certificates and server certificates, and that's enough.
We need an equivalent to tls-unique in order to properly bind the EST channel
to the UA CP SecureChannel, but that's all I think.

    > So when the Pledge Device connects to the Registrar or the Certificate
    > Manager using UA the Device proves it has possession of the Device
    > private key.

    > That said, the KeyPair used for communication does not need to be the
    > same as the KeyPair used to authenticate.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email