Re: [Iot-onboarding] [Anima] Device Certificate Deployment Automation with ACME using BRSKI

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 07 August 2019 21:22 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
cc: "Owen Friel (ofriel)" <ofriel@cisco.com>, "iot-onboarding@ietf.org" <iot-onboarding@ietf.org>, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>, "anima@ietf.org" <anima@ietf.org>
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Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 17:22:24 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Iot-onboarding] [Anima] Device Certificate Deployment Automation with ACME using BRSKI
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Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> wrote:
    > Skimming quickly, I see now the direction to go to a cloud registrar to
    > be redirected to a local registrar.  I feel compelled to point out that
    > this is exactly what SZTP (RFC 8572) does, or at least, supports.
    > Actually, as a more general statement, it was originally said that the
    > two WG's approaches were different, but they are now becoming more and
    > more alike.  Well, since SZTP is published already, it's more like the
    > ANIMA approach is becoming more like SZTP, albeit seemingly with more
    > complexity.

SZTP does not directly result in the same mutually authenticated TLS (EST)
connection to a Registrar that BRSKI does.  This was not an explicit SZTP goal.

What it could do though, is to provide a source of (secure) bootstrap
configuration in which such a connection could be initiated.  In my mind,
I see a fragment of signed JUNOS, IOS (CISCO, not Apple), etc. CLI
configuration that initiates the connection. Such a thing would not be
standardized.
But, I would think that this is exactly the kind of thing that could
be encoded in YANG.

My understanding of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-keystore
is that it would provided for Registrar initiated (PUSH) updating of device
certificates, but would not provide a way for a device to initiate (PULL) to
a securely identified EST server.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-