Re: [Iot-onboarding] BRSKI : proximity registrar cert and MITM question

["M. Ranganathan" <[e-mail]>]

On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 4:10 AM Michael Richardson
<[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>\
>
> In thie case, ISP-A can see that the Voucher-Request pins a certificate which
> is not it's certificate.  It also can see that the TLS connection is from
> an entity other than that which signed the voucher-request, so it knows that
> there was a (failing) attempt to MITM the connection.

Thanks. I think I get the attack scenario although a picture would
help if you have the time (back of envelope sketch will do).

One thing I am unclear of - lets assume the MITM succeeds and attacker
gets an unauthorized voucher. What damage can it do with this voucher?
It still does not have the private key of the legitimate device that
issued the voucher request so it cannot enroll anyway. Is that a
correct statement? (I agree it is a good design to prevent the MITM in
the first place). I suppose that could screw up the MASA if it is
maintaining a log. Anything else?

>
>     >> A lot of situations turn out to be difficult to construct in a
>     >> convincing way because the device is authenticated by it's IDevID, and
>     >> so a MITM would have to have an acceptable IDevID as well.
>
>     > The device signs the request with it's private key and likewise accepts
>     > a Voucher signed by the MASA which it has the ability to verify. How
>     > can a MITM intervene?
>
> Yes, it's because of those signatures that a MITM attempt is defeated.
>
> --
> ]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
> ]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        | network architect  [
> ]     [e-mail]  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [
>
>
> --
> Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>, Sandelman Software Works
>  -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
>
>
>


-- 
M. Ranganathan