Re: [Iot-onboarding] what can pinned-domain-cert actually pin?

Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca> Tue, 24 September 2019 16:42 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>
To: "Owen Friel \(ofriel\)" <ofriel@cisco.com>
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Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 12:42:34 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Iot-onboarding] what can pinned-domain-cert actually pin?
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Owen Friel (ofriel) <ofriel@cisco.com>; wrote:
    >> My take is that this is a lot of code effort in the Pledge.
    >> If the Enterprise/Registrar would cause to be operated a long-lived private
    >> CA, then the problem goes away.   It doesn't have to be operated by the
    >> Enterprise itself; it could be operated by a service provider that they trust.  In
    >> effect, it's just a new form of MASA.
    >>
    >> I think that this is really the right way to go: to allow chains of
    >> vouchers pinning
    >> keys, which can then be used to issue new vouchers (which could pin new keys).
    >> This solves the long-term problems you have mentioned, and removes the
    >> external dependancy upon a MASA.... by createing a new dependancy upon an
    >> internal MASA.

    > I am not convinced that allowing chains of vouchers pinning keys is
    > simpler that allowing a voucher to have 2 or more
    > pinned-domain-certs. In fact, I would the code in the pledge to support
    > chains of vouchers pinning keys is probably more complex than the code
    > to allow an array of pinned-domain-certs in the voucher. With any TLS
    > library code I have ever messed with, you setup the trust store to
    > include your set of 1 or more CAs, and the TLS stack takes care of
    > everything once the trust store is setup. If you have a chain of
    > vouchers pinning keys - then that's all application specific code.

I think that it solves the problem you outlined, but also also solves the
resale-without-MASA problem, and it solves concerns from Siemens Transport.

(BTW: Do you have access to an EAP-TEAP code base?)

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]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect   [
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