[ippm] Fw: I-D Action: draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-10.txt

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Date: Mon, 07 Apr 2025 16:10:19 +0000
From: "nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com" <nalini.elkins@insidethestack.com>
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Subject: [ippm] Fw: I-D Action: draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-10.txt
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Guys,
Please comment on this draft.  We want to get agreement and have discussion on these things before proceeding.   Confusion / misunderstanding on what we were trying to achieve and why was the reason (IMHO!) for many of the IESG comments.  So, we very much would like the WG to chime in.
To review:
PDMv2 is an IPv6 Destination Options Extension Header that enhances PDM [RFC8250] by adding confidentiality, integrity, and authentication to its measurement data.   
PDMv2 Foundational Principles
   The design of PDMv2 adheres to a set of foundational principles which guide its architecture and operational model:
   1.  Offline Decryption: All decryption of data occurs offline,  eliminating the computational overhead of real-time decryption on network devices.
   2.  Speed of Handshake Processing: The goal of PDMv2 is to have as little time spent in handshake processing as possible.
   3.  Handshake at IP Layer: The establishment of session keys is at the IP layer not at the transport or session layers.  However, keys will be changed when there is a change in the 5-tuple.  For ICMP and IPsec, sender-destination IP pair defines the session       for key rotation purposes.
   4.  Separation of Encryption Layers: Encryption at the extension header level is designed to be independent of encryption in higher-layer protocols (e.g., TLS, QUIC).  This avoids bootstrapping problems where key negotiation at one layer (IP) is dependent on information from another layer (TCP / TLS).
   5.  Key Reuse Avoidance: Keys are not reused between sessions.  Each session uses a freshly derived key to enhance security and forward secrecy.
   6.  Base Key Registration: Master keys and device authentication are established through a registration process with an Authentication Server.  A complementary draft will detail the full registration procedure and the operation of the Decryption Server that handles       offline decryption.
   7.  Sequential Field for Key Derivation: Each packet may include a sequential field (in cleartext), which serves as input to a key derivation function (KDF).  This supports dynamic keying mechanisms such as those used in Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE).
   8.  Sample Key Derivation Implementation: A sample implementation using HPKE will be included to illustrate how these principles can be applied in practice.  Alternative KDFs may be used, based on implementation needs.
   9.  Optional Sequential Field Usage: A field which may be used as a nonce and is sent in the clear will be provided.  Usage of this sequential field is optional and can be omitted if not required for the cryptographic scheme in use.  It is required for HPKE but       the implementor may choose another scheme.


Thanks,

PresidentIndustry Network Technology Councilhttps://www.industrynetcouncil.org 

   ----- Forwarded Message ----- From: "internet-drafts@ietf.org" <internet-drafts@ietf.org>To: "i-d-announce@ietf.org" <i-d-announce@ietf.org>Cc: "ippm@ietf.org" <ippm@ietf.org>Sent: Sunday, April 6, 2025 at 06:45:31 PM PDTSubject: [ippm] I-D Action: draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-10.txt
 Internet-Draft draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-10.txt is now available. It is
a work item of the IP Performance Measurement (IPPM) WG of the IETF.

  Title:  IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics Version 2 (PDMv2) Destination Option
  Authors: Nalini Elkins
            Michael Ackermann
            Ameya Deshpande
            Tommaso Pecorella
            Adnan Rashid
  Name:    draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-10.txt
  Pages:  23
  Dates:  2025-04-06

Abstract:

  RFC8250 describes an optional Destination Option (DO) header embedded
  in each packet to provide sequence numbers and timing information as
  a basis for measurements.  As this data is sent in clear-text, this
  may create an opportunity for malicious actors to get information for
  subsequent attacks.  This document defines PDMv2 which has a
  lightweight handshake (registration procedure) and encryption to
  secure this data.  Additional performance metrics which may be of use
  are also defined.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2/

There is also an HTMLized version available at:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-10

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-ietf-ippm-encrypted-pdmv2-10

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts


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