[ippm] Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-ippm-capacity-protocol-20: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Paul Wouters via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 24 June 2025 21:26 UTC

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Subject: [ippm] Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-ippm-capacity-protocol-20: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Paul Wouters has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-ippm-capacity-protocol-20: Discuss

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----------------------------------------------------------------------
DISCUSS:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The main point of my DISCUSS is around the protocols authentication and encryption.
It is a homegrown protocol, very restricted in cryptographic options, no ephemeral
key exchange and unsafe use of PSK. Why is this protocol not using DTLS for its
security features instead of inventing its own using low level openssl functions
as a security protocol ?

All of the Cryptogrpahic issues would go away, if you just optionally allow to use DTLS 1.2
or later.


1) secure hash algorithm

The document claims a number of times that low power devices are an important use
case. If so, AES-CMAC (RFC4494) would be more appropriate than HMAC-SHA256

2) using the KDF

        The KDF SHALL use the following parameters:
        [...]

It should more clearly specify thow these parameters are used. One likely method
is concatenation in the order of the listed parameters, but if so, it should
clearly state this, eg  KDF(Kin || Label || Context || r) and it should specify
how to deal with input that is larger in size than the input of the KDF.

        The authUnixTime field serves as a nonce

This KDF use is not safe against writing a bruce force engine of captured
traffic where the only unknown is the PreSharedKey. I think this could be
cracked in realtime using something like https://hashcat.net/hashcat/ for
every PSK under 16 characters. As PSK is "out of scope", it seriously runs
the risk of going in the clear in email or a phone call with a low entropy
phrase.

3) auth and enc key generation

Why are the authenticaion and encryption keys of a different length/strength ?
This would make the resulting strength the least of the two, eg 128bit.
It only costs 1 HMAC-SHA2 operation more (4 instead of 3) to get 256bit keys
for both. Or, you could use AES-CCM / AES-GCM and use an AEAD when encryption
is needed which requires 256bit (or you can pick/choose 128bit)

Which brings me to another point, at this point CBC should really not be
deployed for new protocols anymore. Please use AES-CCM or AES-GCM. Especially
if low power devices are being targeted, using AES-CBC-SHA256 is far more
expensive (and less secure) compared to AES-CCM/AES-GCM (and SHA256).
Of course, this does require safe handling of the counters.

4) encryption streams

How are different streams using encryption? Same key? How is uniqueness in IV
ensured? Or when switching to CCM/GCM, how are counters not re-used?

5) random

        The sender SHALL populate the initVector field with a
        cryptographically random 16-octet Initialization Vector (IV),

On low power devices, getting a good random source is not always easy
either. This would be easier if one were to use an AEAD as well, and
use the authUnixTime as a nonce with a proper counter instead of a
random IV. For AES-CBC you would have to use an explicit IV (eg send
it over the wire) to allow decrypting out of order packets (eg see
RFC3602) which means generating randomness per packet. With AEAD
you only need to guarantee uniqueness, not unpredictability (aka random).

I also would think the protocol should not hardcode AES-CBC-SHA256, but
use a registry similar to AlgID.


       AUTHMODE_3:    Optional Encrypted mode

You want to say: Optional Encrypted plus Authenticated Control and Data phase mode.


     Authentication and encryption methods and requirements steadily evolve.
     Alternate encryption and/or authentication modes provide for algorithm
     agility by defining a new Mode, whose support is indicated by an assigning
     a suitable "Test Setup PDU Authentication Mode Registry" value (see Section 11.3.4 ).

But this registry only has different modes of using authentication or encryption. All the
actual values for these (HMAC-SHA256 and AES-CBC) are hardcoded and implicit, so when one
in the future would add something else (eg encryption with AES-CMAC and AES-CTR) the current
naming does not work at all for this registry.


----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------


Titel says:

        Test Protocol for One-way IP Capacity Measurement

Abstract says:

        This document defines the UDP Speed Test Protocol for conducting
        RFC 9097 and other related measurements.

The Introduction says:

        This document specifies the UDP Speed Test Protocol (UDPSTP)

Can these terms be made consistent?


I am skeptical of the value of speed meassurements for anything using specific ports,
as it is allows the network to treat these differently from "regular" traffic. Eg we
commonly see "speedtest.net" outperforming reality. I see it can still be useful in
labs (but then I question the authentication/encryption parts being neccessary at all)


       Test Setup Request and Response: If a server instance is
        identified with a host name that resolves to both IPv4/IPv6
        addresses, it is recommended to use the first address returned
        in the name resolution response - regardless, whether it's IPv4
        or IPv6. Thus, the decision on the preferred IP address family
        is left to the DNS operator.

I don't understand this part. If the application sends out a query for AAAA
before A, or A before AAAA, that will make a difference that is not "left to
the DNS operator" at all. There is currently no way to ask for A + AAAA within
the same DNS packet, but once it does (there are efforts on their way) then
both would arrive at the same time in the same answer.


        The encrypted portion of each PDU SHALL contain the padding required

I believe you mean "the cleartext to be encrypted shall be padded to ...." ?