Re: [ippm] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03: (with COMMENT)

[Giuseppe Fioccola <[e-mail]>]

Hi Roman,
Thank you for the review.
Please find my replies inline tagged as [GF].

Regards,

Giuseppe

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Subject: Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03: (with COMMENT)

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-ippm-explicit-flow-measurements-03: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thank you to Steve Hanna for the SECDIR review.

** Certain documents previously published out of IPPM were only intended for
closed deployments (sometimes called “limited domains”).  Are the approaches
described in this document intended for the Internet?  It would be helpful to
state the applicability.

[GF]: The methods described in this document are transport agnostic and potentially applicable to any transport-layer protocol, especially valuable for encrypted protocols. In theory, these methods can be applied to both limited domains and Internet, depending on the specific protocol application. I will add this consideration in the next version of the draft.

** Section 6.  Given that Section 7 reminds the reader that “[a]uthentication
techniques may be used where appropriate to guard against these traffic
attacks”, what would that mean in the context of QUIC and TCP?

[GF]: This is a general statement. It may not be valid for QUIC since in that case the scope of the measurements should be to make performance information directly visible to the path.

** Section 7.  It appears that these measurement fields introduced in the
packet are intended only for the sender and recipient with little information
to any intermediaries.  This seems like a recipe for a covert channel not
inspected by typical security devices.  Consider noting this possibility.

[GF]: Ok, we will add a consideration about the possibility of a covert channel in the next version.