< draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-05.txt		draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-06.txt >
	Network Working Group G. Mirsky		Network Working Group G. Mirsky
	Internet-Draft ZTE Corp.		Internet-Draft ZTE Corp.
	Intended status: Standards Track G. Jun		Intended status: Standards Track G. Jun
	Expires: June 1, 2019 ZTE Corporation		Expires: October 25, 2019 ZTE Corporation
	H. Nydell		H. Nydell
	Accedian Networks		Accedian Networks
	R. Foote		R. Foote
	Nokia		Nokia
	November 28, 2018		April 23, 2019
	Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol		Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
	draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-05		draft-ietf-ippm-stamp-06
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes a Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol		This document describes a Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
	which enables the measurement of both one-way and round-trip		which enables the measurement of both one-way and round-trip
	performance metrics like delay, delay variation, and packet loss.		performance metrics like delay, delay variation, and packet loss.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 37 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on June 1, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	skipping to change at page 2, line 18 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 18 ¶
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Theory of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. Theory of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . . . 4		4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . . . 4
	4.1.1. Session-Sender Packet Format in Unauthenticated Mode 4		4.1.1. Session-Sender Packet Format in Unauthenticated Mode 4
	4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode . 7		4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode . 6
	4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . 7		4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format . . . . . . 7
	4.2.1. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Unauthenticated		4.2.1. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Unauthenticated
	Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode 10		4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode 9
	4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP . . . . 12		4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP . . . . 11
	4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Development and deployment of Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol		Development and deployment of Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
	(TWAMP) [RFC5357] and its extensions, e.g., [RFC6038] that defined		(TWAMP) [RFC5357] and its extensions, e.g., [RFC6038] that defined
	features such as Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size for TWAMP		features such as Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size for TWAMP
	provided invaluable experience. Several independent implementations		provided invaluable experience. Several independent implementations
	exist, have been deployed and provide important operational		exist, have been deployed and provide important operational
	performance measurements. At the same time, there has been		performance measurements. At the same time, there has been
	noticeable interest in using a simpler mechanism for active		noticeable interest in using a simpler mechanism for active
	performance monitoring that can provide deterministic behavior and		performance monitoring that can provide deterministic behavior and
	inherit separation of control (vendor-specific configuration or		inherit separation of control (vendor-specific configuration or
	orchestration) and test functions. One of such is Performance		orchestration) and test functions. One of such is Performance
	Measurement from IP Edge to Customer Equipment using TWAMP Light from		Measurement from IP Edge to Customer Equipment using TWAMP Light from
	Broadband Forum ([BBF.TR-390]). This document defines active		Broadband Forum [BBF.TR-390] used as the reference TWAMP Light that,
	performance measurement test protocol, Simple Two-way Active		according to [RFC8545], includes sub-set of TWAMP-Test functions in
	Measurement Protocol (STAMP), that enables measurement of both one-		combination with other applications that provide, for example,
	way and round-trip performance metrics like delay, delay variation,		control and security. This document defines active performance
	and packet loss.		measurement test protocol, Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
			(STAMP), that enables measurement of both one-way and round-trip
			performance metrics like delay, delay variation, and packet loss.
	2. Conventions used in this document		2. Conventions used in this document
	2.1. Terminology		2.1. Terminology
	AES Advanced Encryption Standard		AES Advanced Encryption Standard
	CBC Cipher Block Chaining		CBC Cipher Block Chaining
	ECB Electronic Cookbook		ECB Electronic Cookbook
	skipping to change at page 3, line 39 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 41 ¶
	2.2. Requirements Language		2.2. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement		3. Softwarization of Performance Measurement
	Figure 1 presents Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol (STAMP)		Figure 1 presents the Simple Two-way Active Measurement Protocol
	Session-Sender and Session-Reflector with a measurement session. The		(STAMP) Session-Sender and Session-Reflector with a measurement
	configuration and management of the STAMP Session-Sender, Session-		session. The configuration and management of the STAMP Session-
	Reflector and management of the STAMP sessions can be achieved		Sender, Session-Reflector and management of the STAMP sessions can be
	through various means. Command Line Interface, OSS/BSS using SNMP or		achieved through various means. Command Line Interface, OSS/BSS
	SDN using Netconf/YANG are but a few examples.		(operations support system/business support system as a combination
			of two systems used to support a range of telecommunication services)
			using SNMP or controllers in Software-Defined Networking using
			Netconf/YANG are but a few examples.
	o----------------------------------------------------------o		o----------------------------------------------------------o
	| Configuration and |		| Configuration and |
	| Management |		| Management |
	o----------------------------------------------------------o		o----------------------------------------------------------o
	|| ||		|| ||
	|| ||		|| ||
	|| ||		|| ||
	+----------------------+ +-------------------------+		+----------------------+ +-------------------------+
	| STAMP Session-Sender | <--- STAMP---> | STAMP Session-Reflector |		| STAMP Session-Sender | <--- STAMP---> | STAMP Session-Reflector |
	skipping to change at page 4, line 28 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 28 ¶
	4. Theory of Operation		4. Theory of Operation
	STAMP Session-Sender transmits test packets toward STAMP Session-		STAMP Session-Sender transmits test packets toward STAMP Session-
	Reflector. STAMP Session-Reflector receives Session-Sender's packet		Reflector. STAMP Session-Reflector receives Session-Sender's packet
	and acts according to the configuration and optional control		and acts according to the configuration and optional control
	information communicated in the Session-Sender's test packet. STAMP		information communicated in the Session-Sender's test packet. STAMP
	defines two different test packet formats, one for packets		defines two different test packet formats, one for packets
	transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Sender and one for packets		transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Sender and one for packets
	transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Reflector. STAMP supports two		transmitted by the STAMP-Session-Reflector. STAMP supports two
	modes: unauthenticated and authenticated. Unauthenticated STAMP test		modes: unauthenticated and authenticated. Unauthenticated STAMP test
	packets are compatible on the wire with unauthenticated TWAMP-Test		packets, defined in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.2.1, ensure
	[RFC5357] packet formats.		interworking between STAMP and TWAMP Light as described in
			Section 4.4 packet formats.
	By default, STAMP uses symmetrical packets, i.e., size of the packet		By default, STAMP uses symmetrical packets, i.e., size of the packet
	transmitted by Session-Reflector equals the size of the packet		transmitted by Session-Reflector equals the size of the packet
	received by the Session-Reflector.		received by the Session-Reflector.
	4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format		4.1. Session-Sender Behavior and Packet Format
	4.1.1. Session-Sender Packet Format in Unauthenticated Mode
	Because STAMP supports symmetrical test packets, STAMP Session-Sender		Because STAMP supports symmetrical test packets, STAMP Session-Sender
	packet has a minimum size of 44 octets in unauthenticated mode, see		packet has a minimum size of 44 octets in unauthenticated mode, see
	Figure 2, and 48 octets in the authenticated mode, see Figure 4.		Figure 2, and 112 octets in the authenticated mode, see Figure 4.
	For unauthenticated mode:		4.1.1. Session-Sender Packet Format in Unauthenticated Mode
			STAMP Session-Sender packet format in unauthenticated mode:
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Sequence Number |		| Sequence Number |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Timestamp |		| Timestamp |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Error Estimate | |		| Error Estimate | |
	skipping to change at page 5, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 27 ¶
	| MBZ (27 octets) |		| MBZ (27 octets) |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| | Server Octets | |		| | Server Octets | |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
	| Remaining Packet Padding (to be reflected) |		| Remaining Packet Padding (to be reflected) |
	~ (length in octets specified in Server Octets) ~		~ (length in octets specified in Server Octets) ~
	+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| | Comp.MBZ |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Type | Length |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	~ Value ~
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 2: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in unauthenticated		Figure 2: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in unauthenticated
	mode		mode
	where fields are defined as the following:		where fields are defined as the following:
	o Sequence Number is four octets long field. For each new session		o Sequence Number is four octets long field. For each new session
	its value starts at zero and is incremented with each transmitted		its value starts at zero and is incremented with each transmitted
	packet.		packet.
	o Timestamp is eight octets long field. STAMP node MUST support		o Timestamp is eight octets long field. STAMP node MUST support
	Network Time Protocol (NTP) version 4 64-bit timestamp format		Network Time Protocol (NTP) version 4 64-bit timestamp format
	[RFC5905]. STAMP node MAY support IEEE 1588v2 Precision Time		[RFC5905], the format used in [RFC5357]. STAMP node MAY support
	Protocol truncated 64-bit timestamp format [IEEE.1588.2008].		IEEE 1588v2 Precision Time Protocol truncated 64-bit timestamp
			format [IEEE.1588.2008], the format used in [RFC8186].
	o Error Estimate is two octets long field with format displayed in		o Error Estimate is two octets long field with format displayed in
	Figure 3		Figure 3
	0 1		0 1
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	|S|Z| Scale | Multiplier |		|S|Z| Scale | Multiplier |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 3: Error Estimate Format		Figure 3: Error Estimate Format
	skipping to change at page 6, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 6, line 29 ¶
	The STAMP Session-Sender and Session-Reflector MAY use, not use,		The STAMP Session-Sender and Session-Reflector MAY use, not use,
	or set value of the Z field in accordance with the timestamp		or set value of the Z field in accordance with the timestamp
	format in use. This optional field is to enhance operations, but		format in use. This optional field is to enhance operations, but
	local configuration or defaults could be used in its place.		local configuration or defaults could be used in its place.
	o Must-be-Zero (MBZ) field in the session-sender unauthenticated		o Must-be-Zero (MBZ) field in the session-sender unauthenticated
	packet is 27 octets long. It MUST be all zeroed on the		packet is 27 octets long. It MUST be all zeroed on the
	transmission and ignored on receipt.		transmission and ignored on receipt.
	o Server Octets field is two octets long field. It MUST follow the		o Server Octets field is optional two octets long field. This field
	27 octets long MBZ field. The Reflect Octets capability defined		is used for the Reflect Octets capability defined in [RFC6038].
	in [RFC6038]. The value in the Server Octets field equals the		If being used, the Server Octets field MUST follow the 27 octets
			long MBZ field. The value in the Server Octets field equals the
	number of octets the Session-Reflector is expected to copy back to		number of octets the Session-Reflector is expected to copy back to
	the Session-Sender starting with the Server Octets field. Thus		the Session-Sender starting with the Server Octets field. Thus
	the minimal non-zero value for the Server Octets field is two.		the minimum non-zero value for the Server Octets field is two.
	Therefore, the value of one is invalid. If none of Payload to be		Therefore, the value of one is invalid. If none of Payload to be
	copied, the value of the Server Octets field MUST be set to zero		copied, the value of the Server Octets field MUST be set to zero
	on transmit.		on transmit.
	o Remaining Packet Padding is an optional field of variable length.		o Remaining Packet Padding is an optional field of variable length.
	The number of octets in the Remaining Packet Padding field is the		The number of octets in the Remaining Packet Padding field is the
	value of the Server Octets field less the length of the Server		value of the Server Octets field minus the length of the Server
	Octets field.		Octets field.
	o Comp.MBZ is variable length field used to achieve alignment on a
	word boundary. Thus the length of Comp.MBZ field may be only 0,
	1, 2 or 3 octets. The value of the field MUST be zeroed on
	transmission and ignored on receipt.
	4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode		4.1.2. Session-Sender Packet Format in Authenticated Mode
	For authenticated mode:		STAMP Session-Sender packet format in authenticated mode:
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Sequence Number |		| Sequence Number |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	| MBZ (12 octets) |		| MBZ (12 octets) |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Timestamp |		| Timestamp |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Error Estimate | |		| Error Estimate | |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
	~ ~		~ ~
	| MBZ (70 octets) |		| MBZ (70 octets) |
	~ ~		~ ~
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Type | Length |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	~ Value ~
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	~ Comp.MBZ ~
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	| HMAC (16 octets) |		| HMAC (16 octets) |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 4: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in authenticated		Figure 4: STAMP Session-Sender test packet format in authenticated
	mode		mode
	The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode,		The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode,
	listed in Section 4.1.1. Also, Comp.MBZ field is variable length		listed in Section 4.1.1. Also, Comp.MBZ field is a variable length
	field to align the packet on 16 octets boundary. Also, the packet		field to align the packet on 16 octets boundary. Also, the packet
	includes a key-hashed message authentication code (HMAC) ([RFC2104])		includes a key-hashed message authentication code (HMAC) ([RFC2104])
	hash at the end of the PDU.		hash at the end of the PDU. The detailed use of the HMAC field is
			described in Section 4.3.
	4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format		4.2. Session-Reflector Behavior and Packet Format
	The Session-Reflector receives the STAMP test packet, verifies it,		The Session-Reflector receives the STAMP test packet, verifies it,
	prepares and transmits the reflected test packet.		prepares and transmits the reflected test packet.
	Two modes of STAMP Session-Reflector characterize the expected		Two modes of STAMP Session-Reflector characterize the expected
	behavior and, consequently, performance metrics that can be measured:		behavior and, consequently, performance metrics that can be measured:
	o Stateless - STAMP Session-Reflector does not maintain test state		o Stateless - STAMP Session-Reflector does not maintain test state
	skipping to change at page 9, line 30 ¶		skipping to change at page 8, line 44 ¶
	| Session-Sender Timestamp |		| Session-Sender Timestamp |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Session-Sender Error Estimate | MBZ |		| Session-Sender Error Estimate | MBZ |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	|Ses-Sender TTL | |		|Ses-Sender TTL | |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
	| |		| |
	~ Packet Padding (reflected) ~		~ Packet Padding (reflected) ~
	+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| | Comp.MBZ |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Type | Length |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	~ Value ~
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 5: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in		Figure 5: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in
	unauthenticated mode		unauthenticated mode
	where fields are defined as the following:		where fields are defined as the following:
	o Sequence Number is four octets long field. The value of the		o Sequence Number is four octets long field. The value of the
	Sequence Number field is set according to the mode of the STAMP		Sequence Number field is set according to the mode of the STAMP
	Session-Reflector:		Session-Reflector:
	skipping to change at page 10, line 17 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 28 ¶
	Z flag of the Error Estimate field as described in Section 4.1.		Z flag of the Error Estimate field as described in Section 4.1.
	o Error Estimate has the same size and interpretation as described		o Error Estimate has the same size and interpretation as described
	in Section 4.1.		in Section 4.1.
	o Session-Sender Sequence Number, Session-Sender Timestamp, and		o Session-Sender Sequence Number, Session-Sender Timestamp, and
	Session-Sender Error Estimate are copies of the corresponding		Session-Sender Error Estimate are copies of the corresponding
	fields in the STAMP test packet sent by the Session-Sender.		fields in the STAMP test packet sent by the Session-Sender.
	o Session-Sender TTL is one octet long field, and its value is the		o Session-Sender TTL is one octet long field, and its value is the
	copy of the TTL field from the received STAMP test packet.		copy of the TTL field in IPv4 (or Hop Limit in IPv6) from the
			received STAMP test packet.
	o Packet Padding (reflected) is an optional variable length field.		o Packet Padding (reflected) is an optional variable length field.
	The length of the Packet Padding (reflected) field MUST be equal		The length of the Packet Padding (reflected) field MUST be equal
	to the value of the Server Octets field (Figure 2). If the value		to the value of the Server Octets field (Figure 2). If the value
	is non-zero, the Session-Reflector MUST copy number of octets		is non-zero, the Session-Reflector MUST copy number of octets
	equal to the value of Server Octets field starting with the Server		equal to the value of Server Octets field starting with the Server
	Octets field.		Octets field.
	o Comp.MBZ is variable length field used to achieve alignment on a		o Comp.MBZ is a variable length field used to achieve alignment on a
	word boundary. Thus the length of Comp.MBZ field may be only 0,		word boundary. Thus the length of Comp.MBZ field may be only 0,
	1, 2 or 3 octets. The value of the field MUST be zeroed on		1, 2 or 3 octets. The value of the field MUST be zeroed on
	transmission and ignored on receipt.		transmission and ignored on receipt.
	4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode		4.2.2. Session-Reflector Packet Format in Authenticated Mode
	For the authenticated mode:		For the authenticated mode:
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	skipping to change at page 11, line 27 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 39 ¶
	| Session-Sender Error Estimate | |		| Session-Sender Error Estimate | |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
	| MBZ (6 octets) |		| MBZ (6 octets) |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	|Ses-Sender TTL | |		|Ses-Sender TTL | |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +
	| |		| |
	| MBZ (15 octets) |		| MBZ (15 octets) |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Type | Length |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	~ Value ~
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	~ Comp.MBZ ~
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| HMAC (16 octets) |		| HMAC (16 octets) |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 6: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in authenticated		Figure 6: STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in authenticated
	mode		mode
	The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode,		The field definitions are the same as the unauthenticated mode,
	listed in Section 4.2.1. Additionally, the packet MAY include		listed in Section 4.2.1. Additionally, the packet MAY include
	Comp.MBZ field is variable length field to align the packet on 16		Comp.MBZ field is a variable length field to align the packet on 16
	octets boundary. Also, STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in		octets boundary. Also, STAMP Session-Reflector test packet format in
	authenticated mode includes a key (HMAC) ([RFC2104]) hash at the end		authenticated mode includes a key (HMAC) ([RFC2104]) hash at the end
	of the PDU.		of the PDU. The detailed use of the HMAC field is in Section 4.3.
	4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP		4.3. Integrity and Confidentiality Protection in STAMP
	To provide integrity protection, each STAMP message is being		To provide integrity protection, each STAMP message is being
	authenticated by adding Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC).		authenticated by adding Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC).
	STAMP uses HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 128 bits (similarly to the use		STAMP uses HMAC-SHA-256 truncated to 128 bits (similarly to the use
	of it in IPSec defined in [RFC4868]); hence the length of the HMAC		of it in IPSec defined in [RFC4868]); hence the length of the HMAC
	field is 16 octets. HMAC uses own key and the definition of the		field is 16 octets. HMAC uses own key and the definition of the
	mechanism to distribute the HMAC key is outside the scope of this		mechanism to distribute the HMAC key is outside the scope of this
	specification. One example is to use an orchestrator to configure		specification. One example is to use an orchestrator to configure
	HMAC key based on STAMP YANG data model [I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang].		HMAC key based on STAMP YANG data model [I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang].
	HMAC MUST be verified as early as possible to avoid using or		HMAC MUST be verified as early as possible to avoid using or
	propagating corrupted data.		propagating corrupted data.
	If confidentiality protection for STAMP is required, encryption at		If confidentiality protection for STAMP is required, encryption at
	the higher level MUST be used.		the higher level MUST be used. For example, STAMP packets could be
			transmitted in the dedicated IPsec tunnel or share the IPsec tunnel
			with the monitored flow.
	4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light		4.4. Interoperability with TWAMP Light
	One of the essential requirements to STAMP is the ability to		One of the essential requirements to STAMP is the ability to
	interwork with TWAMP Light device. There are two possible		interwork with a TWAMP Light device. There are two possible
	combinations for such use case:		combinations for such use case:
	o STAMP Session-Sender with TWAMP Light Session-Reflector;		o STAMP Session-Sender with TWAMP Light Session-Reflector;
	o TWAMP Light Session-Sender with STAMP Session-Reflector.		o TWAMP Light Session-Sender with STAMP Session-Reflector.
	In the former case, Session-Sender MAY not be aware that its Session-		In the former case, the Session-Sender MAY not be aware that its
	Reflector does not support STAMP. For example, TWAMP Light Session-		Session-Reflector does not support STAMP. For example, a TWAMP Light
	Reflector may not support the use of UDP port 862 as defined in		Session-Reflector may not support the use of UDP port 862 as defined
	[I-D.ietf-ippm-port-twamp-test]. Thus STAMP Session-Sender MUST be		in [RFC8545]. Thus STAMP Session-Sender MUST be able to send test
	able to send test packets to destination UDP port number from the		packets to destination UDP port number from the Dynamic and/or
	Dynamic and/or Private Ports range 49152-65535, test management		Private Ports range 49152-65535, test management system should find a
	system should find port number that both devices can use. And if any		port number that both devices can use. And if any of STAMP
	of TLV-based STAMP extensions are used, the TWAMP Light Session-		extensions are used, the TWAMP Light Session-Reflector will view them
	Reflector will view them as Packet Padding field. The Session-Sender		as Packet Padding field. The Session-Sender SHOULD use the default
	SHOULD use the default format for its timestamps - NTP. And it MAY		format for its timestamps - NTP. And it MAY use PTPv2 timestamp
	use PTPv2 timestamp format.		format.
	In the latter scenario, the test management system should set STAMP		In the latter scenario, the test management system should set STAMP
	Session-Reflector to use UDP port number from the Dynamic and/or		Session-Reflector to use UDP port number from the Dynamic and/or
	Private Ports range. As for Packet Padding field that the TWAMP		Private Ports range. As for Packet Padding field that the TWAMP
	Light Session-Sender includes in its transmitted packet, the STAMP		Light Session-Sender includes in its transmitted packet, the STAMP
	Session-Reflector will process it according to [RFC6038] and return		Session-Reflector will process it according to [RFC6038] and return
	reflected packet of the symmetrical size. The Session-Reflector MUST		reflected packet of the symmetrical size. The Session-Reflector MUST
	use the default format for its timestamps - NTP.		use the default format for its timestamps - NTP.
	5. IANA Considerations		5. IANA Considerations
	This document doesn't have any IANA action. This section may be		This document doesn't have any IANA action. This section may be
	removed before the publication.		removed before the publication.
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
			In general, all the security considerations related to TWAMP-Test,
			discussed in [RFC5357] apply to STAMP. Since STAMP uses the well-
			known UDP port number allocated for the OWAMP-Test/TWAMP-Test
			Receiver port, the security considerations and measures to mitigate
			the risk of the attack using the registered port number documented in
			Section 6 [RFC8545] equally apply to STAMP. Because of the control
			and management of a STAMP test being outside the scope of this
			specification only the more general requirement is set:
			To mitigate the possible attack vector, the control and management
			of a STAMP test session MUST use the secured transport.
	Use of HMAC-SHA-256 in the authenticated mode protects the data		Use of HMAC-SHA-256 in the authenticated mode protects the data
	integrity of the STAMP test packets.		integrity of the STAMP test packets.
	7. Acknowledgments		7. Acknowledgments
	Authors express their appreciation to Jose Ignacio Alvarez-Hamelin		Authors express their appreciation to Jose Ignacio Alvarez-Hamelin
	and Brian Weis for their great insights into the security and		and Brian Weis for their great insights into the security and
	identity protection, and the most helpful and practical suggestions.		identity protection, and the most helpful and practical suggestions.
			Also, our sincere thanks to David Ball for his thorough review and
			helpful comments.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[BBF.TR-390]
	"Performance Measurement from IP Edge to Customer
	Equipment using TWAMP Light", BBF TR-390, May 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-ippm-port-twamp-test]
	Morton, A. and G. Mirsky, "OWAMP and TWAMP Well-Known Port
	Assignments", draft-ietf-ippm-port-twamp-test-03 (work in
	progress), November 2018.
	[IEEE.1588.2008]		[IEEE.1588.2008]
	"Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol		"Standard for a Precision Clock Synchronization Protocol
	for Networked Measurement and Control Systems",		for Networked Measurement and Control Systems",
	IEEE Standard 1588, March 2008.		IEEE Standard 1588, March 2008.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	skipping to change at page 14, line 24 ¶		skipping to change at page 13, line 34 ¶
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8186] Mirsky, G. and I. Meilik, "Support of the IEEE 1588		[RFC8186] Mirsky, G. and I. Meilik, "Support of the IEEE 1588
	Timestamp Format in a Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol		Timestamp Format in a Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
	(TWAMP)", RFC 8186, DOI 10.17487/RFC8186, June 2017,		(TWAMP)", RFC 8186, DOI 10.17487/RFC8186, June 2017,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8186>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8186>.
			[RFC8545] Morton, A., Ed. and G. Mirsky, Ed., "Well-Known Port
			Assignments for the One-Way Active Measurement Protocol
			(OWAMP) and the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
			(TWAMP)", RFC 8545, DOI 10.17487/RFC8545, March 2019,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8545>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
			[BBF.TR-390]
			"Performance Measurement from IP Edge to Customer
			Equipment using TWAMP Light", BBF TR-390, May 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang]		[I-D.ietf-ippm-stamp-yang]
	Mirsky, G., Xiao, M., and W. Luo, "Simple Two-way Active		Mirsky, G., Xiao, M., and W. Luo, "Simple Two-way Active
	Measurement Protocol (STAMP) Data Model", draft-ietf-ippm-		Measurement Protocol (STAMP) Data Model", draft-ietf-ippm-
	stamp-yang-02 (work in progress), September 2018.		stamp-yang-03 (work in progress), March 2019.
	[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-		[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
	Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,		Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
	[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-		[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
	384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,		384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
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