Re: [IPsec] Question about RFC 5114

"Kaz Kobara" <k-kobara@aist.go.jp> Fri, 26 March 2010 22:26 UTC

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From: "Kaz Kobara" <k-kobara@aist.go.jp>
To: <latten@austin.ibm.com>, <mlepinski@bbn.com>, <kent@bbn.com>
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Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2010 07:25:41 +0900
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Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, avagarwa@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Question about RFC 5114
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Hi Joy

When one uses a subgroup like defined in RFC 5114, q (and (p-1)/2q ) must be chosen carefully.

Precisely:
1. q must be a prime number of 2k or more bits where k is a security parameter.
2. q must be a divisor of ((p - 1) / 2).
3. Every factors of (p - 1) / (2q) must also be primes comparable to or greater than q in size.  

p corresponding such q is called a "secure prime."

X is simply to shift the range of 0 to q-2 to 1 to q-1 to exclude 0 (since g^0 mod p = 1).

Kaz

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ipsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Joy Latten
> Sent: Saturday, March 27, 2010 6:25 AM
> To: mlepinski@bbn.com; kent@bbn.com
> Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; avagarwa@redhat.com
> Subject: [IPsec] Question about RFC 5114
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I am looking to implement modp groups 22, 23, and 24 into IKE but have a
> question.
> 
> RFC 5114 gives the prime, p, the generator, g and a subgroup, q, with a
> specific size...
> 
> Because prior rfcs for modp groups did not specify a "q", I was not sure
> if this was a new constant or just stating a size requirement?
> So I took a look at NIST 800-56A. In particular,
> 
> 5.6.1 Private/Public Key Pair Generation
> 
> 5.6.1.1 FFC Key Pair Generation
> For the FFC schemes, each static and ephemeral private key and public
> key shall be generated using an Approved method and the selected valid
> domain parameters (p, q, g{, SEED,pgenCounter}) (see Appendix B of FIPS
> 186-3).
> ...
> 
> I then took a look at FIPS 186-3, Appendix B, which documents 2 methods
> for finite field cryptography (FFC) key pair generation.
> For example, one method is "Key Pair Generation Using Extra Random
> Bits". It actually states that "q" is an input and it is used to do an
> additional computation to compute "x".
> 
> I am somewhat confused, are the modp groups 22, 23 & 24 suppose to use
> one of these new methods and that is why "q" is given in rfc 5114?
> Or am I to ignore this and just continue with existing way
> where "q" is not used and there aren't any additional computations
> to compute x.
> 
> I am not even sure this is correct place to ask, but any advice
> would be welcome.
> 
> regards,
> Joy
> 
> 
> (Cut-n-paste from FIPs 186-3 below to show input and process)
> 
>  Input:
>     (p, q, g)      The subset of the domain parameters that are used
>                    for this process. p, q and g shall either be
>                    provided as integers during input, or shall be
>                    converted to integers prior to use.
> 
> Process:
> 1. N = len(q); L = len(p).    Comment: Check that the (L, N) pair
>                               is specified in Section 4.2.
> 2. If the (L, N) pair is invalid, then return an ERROR indicator,
>    Invalid_x, and Invalid_y.
> 3. requested_security_strength = the security strength associated
>    with the (L, N) pair;      see SP 800-57.
> 4. Obtain a string of N+64 returned_bits from an RBG with a security
>    strength of requested_security_strength or more. If an ERROR
>    indication is returned, then return an ERROR indication,
>    Invalid_x, and Invalid_y.
> 5. Convert returned_bits to the (non-negative) integer c (see
>    Appendix C.2.1).
> 6. x = (c mod (q–1)) + 1.       Comment: 0 ≤ c mod (q–1) ≤ q–2 and
>                                 implies that 1 ≤ x ≤ q–1.
> 7. y = gx mod p.
> 8. Return SUCCESS, x, and y.
> 
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