Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard
Eric Travis <travis@clark.net> Wed, 01 April 1998 17:32 UTC
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Date: Wed, 01 Apr 1998 12:37:30 -0500
From: Eric Travis <travis@clark.net>
To: Christian Huitema <huitema@bellcore.com>
cc: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@research.att.com>, ablair@erols.com, Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@orchard.arlington.ma.us>, iesg@ns.ietf.org, ipsec@tis.com, ietf@ns.ietf.org, tcp-over-satellite@achtung.sp.trw.com
Subject: Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard
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On Tue, 31 Mar 1998, Christian Huitema wrote: > By the way, it should be noted that the only rationale, if any, for > TCP spoofing in the satellite relays is the inadequacy of the end-to-end > TCP implementation. The specificities of satellites and their interaction > with transport protocols have been known for more than 15 years, and the > cure is also very well known: use large windows, use selective > acknowledgments. The only slightly researchy subject is the possible > use of pacing mechanisms to avoid the swings caused by large windows. > TCP support both large windows and selective acknowledgements. A user > that opts for end to end encryption will still get good performances > over satellite links if they also select proper TCP implementations. Actually, no... (!) For one thing, you are assuming that both ends of a transport connection are aware that they have a path including a long-delay path. Good assumption 15 years ago, bad today and in the future. Rather than rehash the problem space here, let me just say that BOTH sides of a TCP connection must use a "proper TCP implementation" when the path includes a satellite hop. For ad hoc connectivity this is a dicey proposition at best; Even if the anonymous ftp server at foo.bar.com was RFC-1323 capable, what makes anyone think it can offer appropriate windows for the available bw-delay product? Second, satellite links take far longer to recover from congestion than their terrestrial counterparts (it turns out to be an r**2 thing with the increase in ratios of relative delays in the path); There are many other little nits that make me disagree with the notion that the problems are "solved" already. Suffice it to say, my vision of future "last hop" connectivity to the Internet backbone is going to be more asymmetric and possibly dirty. For satellite users with long delays, short of upgrading every TCP implementation known on Earth (and flying above) and providing omniscient capabilities to the TCP implementations & applications as to proper socket buffer sizes something else needs be done for performance enhancement. Spoofing conjures up bad images - but there is great benefit to overall performance to splitting a connection. Spoofing/proxying is not just for long delay paths, but also for noisy environments (such as wireless/mobile). It has it's end-to-end downsides, but it's happening already and should be brought out of the closet - if for no other reason than to categorize the impacts (positive and negative) to the larger network. No need to debate it here, we can take it to tcp-over-satellite (exclusively) if you so desire. Regards, Eric
- Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet… The IESG
- Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Inte… Greg Minshall
- RE: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Inte… Roy Pereira
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- Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Inte… Eric Travis
- Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Inte… Phil Karn
- Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Inte… Christian Huitema
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