Re: deriving keying material from the shared secret
Uri Blumenthal <uri@watson.ibm.com> Tue, 09 July 1996 15:07 UTC
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From: Uri Blumenthal <uri@watson.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <9607091510.AA42227@hawpub.watson.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: deriving keying material from the shared secret
To: karn@qualcomm.com
Date: Tue, 09 Jul 1996 11:10:59 -0400
Cc: ipsec@TIS.COM
In-Reply-To: <199607090459.VAA14902@unix.ka9q.ampr.org> from "Phil Karn" at Jul 8, 96 09:59:44 pm
Reply-To: uri@watson.ibm.com
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Phil Karn says: > How critical is the particular hash method used to produce the key > from the shared secret? Cannot answer this one - but hash should be stronger than the algorithm(s) that use the derived key, and hopefully enjoy the same level of trust... > Too critical to just specify a particular hash > method for fear that it might become compromised (e.g., MD5)? I'd say - yes... Plus, it seems to me that there's little benefit in narrowing the choices down to "one hash function for all"... -- Regards, Uri uri@watson.ibm.com -=-=-=-=-=-=- <Disclaimer>
- deriving keying material from the shared secret Steve Bellovin
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… pau
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Hilarie Orman
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Uri Blumenthal
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Bill Sommerfeld
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Phil Karn
- Re: deriving keying material from the shared secr… Uri Blumenthal