IPsec SA establishment through ISAKMP

Titus Peedikayil <titus@routerware.com> Tue, 03 March 1998 05:05 UTC

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From: Titus Peedikayil <titus@routerware.com>
To: "'ipsec@tis.com'" <ipsec@tis.com>
Subject: IPsec SA establishment through ISAKMP
Date: Mon, 02 Mar 1998 21:18:29 -0800
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I would like some clarification on the following thoughts. I have
assumed that each host has seperate OUTBOUND and INBOUND SADs. They also
have seperate OUTBOUND and INBOUND SPDs.

i) When a host A sends an ISAKMP proposal payload to host B, would not
the proposals be based on the INBOUND IPsec policy (SPD) on host A
(since IPsec SAs are receiver-oriented)? And since the SPIs for the
proposals are determined by the protocols supported on host A, the tuple
<destination address, ipsec protocol, SPI> will be unique on host A.

ii) If (i) is correct, then B chooses a proposal based on the OUTBOUND
IPsec policy (SPD) and returns it in its reply (proposal payload). This
proposal represents the IPsec processing (or transforms) that B applies
when it sends data packets to A. So B would create an SA with the
selected proposal in the OUTBOUND SAD.

iii) If (i) is correct, then steps (i) and (ii) only achieves secure
communication from B to A. If B too were to initiate a proposal payload,
then communication could be secured from A to B also just like in (i)
and (ii). But if the ISAKMP on B does not initiate a proposal payload,
is there some way for A to force it?


Thanks

Titus.