Re: [IPsec] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-01.txt

"Valery Smyslov" <svanru@gmail.com> Tue, 04 March 2014 13:46 UTC

Return-Path: <svanru@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 32CEC1A01BF for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 4 Mar 2014 05:46:34 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ElQ9sNGQHhLe for <ipsec@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 4 Mar 2014 05:46:32 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-lb0-x230.google.com (mail-lb0-x230.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4010:c04::230]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 574CB1A0170 for <ipsec@ietf.org>; Tue, 4 Mar 2014 05:46:32 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-lb0-f176.google.com with SMTP id 10so5529865lbg.7 for <ipsec@ietf.org>; Tue, 04 Mar 2014 05:46:28 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=message-id:from:to:cc:references:subject:date:mime-version :content-type:content-transfer-encoding; bh=EDc7BE8D65gmx4nDCKriPADn37WnoPQz+XHoqvECCnY=; b=lmDe+MTrYbUyaZ6/lxQqXCD4ohuEfwnPMVMdZq4DW4bpc+F+QUtFrYH/ZeFZvU7rr3 K9pQjSHYoj+Rz8hoUSuimN/uuJxb7oRtP+u24VVv4t2QGr5aXTtwPWOL94/HMziSljzf kGZEbtfGnCDlPncBNS++8bzNO+qDWvP3NhE/e57wPYOacpw/DQ3LTltLUGzR2ljius6p +1J1HVOfVBkmbDmKfogwHhhY/rjtvnQp/r5hEodqZ9kFBwk0ZnBIATD21Yf5CBoMavzM IlOtMZy+uAiupzCoxmIp0B4McZTl0KqAvzHlkgW93Xeke8TXReVsMzt68A326N9jGfqX 3ejQ==
X-Received: by 10.152.234.130 with SMTP id ue2mr17537000lac.0.1393940788439; Tue, 04 Mar 2014 05:46:28 -0800 (PST)
Received: from buildpc ([93.188.44.200]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPSA id zf7sm35360562lab.7.2014.03.04.05.46.27 for <multiple recipients> (version=TLSv1 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 04 Mar 2014 05:46:27 -0800 (PST)
Message-ID: <476582BCCB394DD0A6DB58434ED55486@buildpc>
From: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@cypherpunks.ca>
References: <B1B032692C7045B7AEA06166F8AC9B9F@buildpc> <21268.39396.785431.297271@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi> <01FD5F789A0A406F9CCFC3033EA6721B@buildpc> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1403040450410.1910@bofh.nohats.ca> <21269.44464.979543.950214@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1403040603500.1910@bofh.nohats.ca> <C165B0187EAE46DB9B9AC3DD97338DEA@buildpc> <alpine.LFD.2.10.1403040804340.9640@bofh.nohats.ca>
Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 17:46:45 +0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format="flowed"; charset="iso-8859-1"; reply-type="response"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.5931
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.6157
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/BLki6-hM_MSj6l_6moHANhD3NVw
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org, Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-01.txt
X-BeenThere: ipsec@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of IPsec protocols <ipsec.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipsec/>
List-Post: <mailto:ipsec@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec>, <mailto:ipsec-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 13:46:34 -0000

>> But what prevent you from throwing away ID content in this case,
>> as you know that it is unauthenticated (you may even not to log it), and 
>> allow user to connect? User has already exposed the
>> content of ID, the damage (if any) has already occured,
>> so what you will you protect by rejecting the connection?
>
> Making the problem visible to it will not happen in the future.

If you consider it as a problem, than there ara other
means to make it visible, e.g. audit that something is
probably wrong.

But you said:
>> And I feel that I need to reject anonymous connections that have an ID
>> to protect the anonymity of the user.

And I just wonder how you are going to protect
user's anonimity if user himself has already exposed
his identity.