[IPsec] ikev2bis issue #184: Interaction of rekeying of the IKE_SA and windows
Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Tue, 30 March 2010 23:59 UTC
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Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 16:59:35 -0700
To: IPsecme WG <ipsec@ietf.org>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: [IPsec] ikev2bis issue #184: Interaction of rekeying of the IKE_SA and windows
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s2.3: Should there be some discussion of the interaction of rekeying of the IKE_SA and windows? Presumably a rekey message should not be actioned until all previous messages have been responded to. Likewise receiving a Message ID with a sequence number bigger than that in the rekey message should be very suspect! Should the INVALID_MESSAGE_ID notification be sent in this case (and before or after the rekey?) There might be some knock on into s2.8 where rekeying is discussed. And maybe into s2.25?
- [IPsec] ikev2bis issue #184: Interaction of rekey… Paul Hoffman
- [IPsec] ikev2bis issue #184: Interaction of rekey… Tero Kivinen