Re: [IPsec] Call for independent experts (IKEv2) for Stage 4 of the PAKE selection process

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Fri, 30 August 2019 14:40 UTC

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Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 10:40:42 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
cc: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>, ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Call for independent experts (IKEv2) for Stage 4 of the PAKE selection process
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On Fri, 30 Aug 2019, Tero Kivinen wrote:

> Current solutions have been trying to keep the identity protection
> part as good as it is without those extensions, i.e., qr-ikev2 still
> provides same identity protection than what normal IKEv2 does, and
> then provides extended protection for the actual trafic keys. Attacker
> who can break Diffie-Hellman can see the identities, but will not see
> the actual trafic protected by PPK.

And libreswan added a method where you can migrate from "no PPK" to
"PPK" by sending two AUTH payloads in the IKE_AUTH. The other end
can then pick which they want to use. Perhaps with PAKE's, it too
could send another AUTH payload in a notify so it does not have to
be sent in IKE_SA_INIT, yet does not incur another round trip if
both parties support the same PAKE.

Paul