Re: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in IKEv2EAPauthentication

"Amjad Inamdar (amjads)" <amjads@cisco.com> Thu, 12 November 2009 10:40 UTC

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Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2009 16:09:02 +0530
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Thread-Topic: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in IKEv2EAPauthentication
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References: <1CFAB1B15A6C1142BD1FC07D1CA82AB2015F102B@XMB-BGL-417.cisco.com><4C814C81-70C3-4597-B279-FED18230331C@checkpoint.com><3A8C969225424C4D8E6BEE65ED8552DA4C446E@XMB-BGL-41C.cisco.com><39008D85-3D9B-4B8B-A9FA-C4C91658630E@checkpoint.com><3A8C969225424C4D8E6BEE65ED8552DA4C4472@XMB-BGL-41C.cisco.com><4A5E60B4-E903-441F-A839-09FE9198B468@checkpoint.com> <19195.18766.767555.230392@fireball.kivinen.iki.fi> <2E13B90533934A499FD727F9B353613C5155A7@zin33exm29.fsl.freescale.net>
From: "Amjad Inamdar (amjads)" <amjads@cisco.com>
To: "Murthy N Srinivas-B22237" <B22237@freescale.com>, "Tero Kivinen" <kivinen@iki.fi>, "Yoav Nir" <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Cc: ipsec@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in IKEv2EAPauthentication
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Hi Murthy,

As per the RFC, with EAP authentication, policy lookups and access
control decisions should be based on EAP identity, so the gatway needs
to know the EAP identity.

The source of EAP identity for gateway is either IDi (when IDi is same
as EAP identity) or AAA server providing authenticated EAP identity
neither of which is mandated by RFC, and in case client(via IDi) and AAA
server do not provide EAP identity, the only way gateway can get EAP
identity is via EAP identity request to the client.

----- Ikev2-bis-05 section 2.16, last paragraph -----
   When the initiator authentication uses EAP, it is possible that the
   contents of the IDi payload is used only for AAA routing purposes and
   selecting which EAP method to use.  This value may be different from
   the identity authenticated by the EAP method.  It is important that
   policy lookups and access control decisions use the actual
   authenticated identity.  Often the EAP server is implemented in a
   separate AAA server that communicates with the IKEv2 responder.  In
   this case, the authenticated identity has to be sent from the AAA
   server to the IKEv2 responder.
----------------------------------------------------------

Thanks,
-Amjad



-----Original Message-----
From: Murthy N Srinivas-B22237 [mailto:B22237@freescale.com] 
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2009 7:30 AM
To: Tero Kivinen; Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; Amjad Inamdar (amjads)
Subject: RE: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in
IKEv2EAPauthentication


 Policy lookups are selected by Authenticator based on Authorization
information received from AAA server after successful Authentication.
The AAA sever uses an attribute(radius) to send a reference to the
Authorization information specific for the specific client.The
Authenticator need not know the EAP identitity of the client, if it is
different from IKE identity.  

The Authenticator requires to know the EAP identity only if it
implements the AAA server functionality.
 
ns murthy

-----Original Message-----
From: ipsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf
Of Tero Kivinen
Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2009 5:01 AM
To: Yoav Nir
Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; Amjad Inamdar (amjads)
Subject: Re: [IPsec] Clarification on identities involved in
IKEv2EAPauthentication

Yoav Nir writes:
> Since the gateway acts as a pass-through, the requirement here is more

> for the client, which is typically more integrated. The client should 
> be prepared to give an identity hint both in IKE and later in the EAP 
> session.

And in that case the identities should really be same, and if they
differ then the authenticated identity needs to be used for policy
lookups, meaning that the EAP identity needs to be used. So the gateway
needs to get that authenticated identity from the AAA server so it can
do policy lookups based on it. 
--
kivinen@iki.fi
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