Re: [IPsec] Updating IPsec algorithm requirements

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Fri, 06 November 2009 22:09 UTC

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Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2009 07:09:32 +0900
To: Paul Koning <Paul_Koning@dell.com>, mcgrew@cisco.com
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Updating IPsec algorithm requirements
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At 2:07 PM -0500 11/6/09, Paul Koning wrote:
>I agree.  For the reasons you gave, and also to remove the temptation
>to run AES-CTR without authentication for performance reasons, even
>though the standard says not to do this.

It is usually not temptation, but by mistake, aided by poor UI practice on the parts of >90% of VPN vendors. That is, I have found few vendors in the VPNC lab that *prevent* you from running with null authentication. Having a combined mode in the mix, particularly if it is the required algorithm, would reduce the prevalence of this kind of mistake.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium