Re: [IPsec] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-10: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Mon, 13 January 2020 17:58 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 09:57:50 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Valery Smyslov <smyslov.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Roman Danyliw' <rdd@cert.org>, 'The IESG' <iesg@ietf.org>, ipsec@ietf.org, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org, david.waltermire@nist.gov, draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-10: (with COMMENT)
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On Wed, Jan 08, 2020 at 05:41:59PM +0300, Valery Smyslov wrote:
> 
> > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-10: No Objection
> > 
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
[...]
> 
> > -- Recommend explaining the notation/relationship between the “prime
> > versions”
> > of the sub-keys (i.e., SK_d’ and SK_pi’ and SK_pr’) in the this SKEYSEED
> > formula with the SKEYSEED formula in Section 2.14 of [RFC72196].
> 
> I'm not sure I fully understand what you mean.
> I think we provide formulas of how prime and non-prime versions
> are correlated (i.e. how non-prime versions are computed from prime versions).
> Am I missing something?

I think the idea is something in the general vicinity of "the un-primed
values SK_d, SK_pi, and SK_pr are used as inputs to subsequent steps of the
IKEv2 exchange; this document uses the primed versions to represent the
output of prf+ that are used directly in regular IKEv2, in order to
introduce an additional operation (combination with PPK) between prf+ and
subsequant usage".  A reader looking at this document and RFC 7296
side-by-side will see that where RFC 7296 sets {SK_d [...]} = prf+
(SKEYSEED, [...]), this document uses the "primed" versions, and might
wonder what's different between SK_d (RFC 7296) and SK_d' (this document).

-Ben