Re: Stream Cipher Transform -- revisited
Tatu Ylonen <ylo@ssh.fi> Wed, 31 July 1996 07:33 UTC
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Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 10:36:52 +0300
Message-Id: <199607310736.KAA18037@pilari.ssh.fi>
From: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@ssh.fi>
To: "Terry L. Davis, Boeing Information & Support Services, Bellevue, WA" <tld5032@commanche.ca.boeing.com>
Cc: Germano Caronni <caronni@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, ipsec@TIS.COM, skip-info@tik.ee.ethz.ch, markson@incog.com, dpalma@netcom.com, Project SKIP <skip@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, Burkhard Stiller <stiller@tik.ee.ethz.ch>, Bernhard Plattner <plattner@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
Subject: Re: Stream Cipher Transform -- revisited
In-Reply-To: <9607301455.AA21468@commanche.ca.boeing.com>
References: <199607031242.OAA10521@kom30.ethz.ch> <9607301455.AA21468@commanche.ca.boeing.com>
Organization: SSH Communications Security, Finland
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> 3) For now, regardless of our personal views, exportability of a
> solution is very important. It seems likely that ciphers may be more
> generally exportable and having more exportable options would appear
> to be win.
The United States does not allow exporting anything that a determined
college kid could not break. This level of (in)security is not
acceptable.
In some cases, the United States allows export if the effort to break
the encryption is not greater for themselves than what a determined
college kid could break. While this may provide somewhat more
protection against non-USG attackers, this is not acceptable for the
rest of the world.
Tatu
- Stream Cipher Transform -- revisited Germano Caronni
- Re: Stream Cipher Transform -- revisited Terry L. Davis, Boeing Information & Support Services, Bellevue, WA
- Re: Stream Cipher Transform -- revisited Tatu Ylonen
- Re: Stream Cipher Transform -- revisited John Gilmore
- Re: Stream Cipher Transform -- revisited C. Harald Koch