Re: [IPsec] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-01.txt

Paul Wouters <paul@cypherpunks.ca> Tue, 04 March 2014 13:05 UTC

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Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2014 08:04:59 -0500 (EST)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@cypherpunks.ca>
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To: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-01.txt
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On Tue, 4 Mar 2014, Valery Smyslov wrote:

>>> But should you reject unauthenticated connections just because they
>>> have ID which you are not authenticating anyways.
>> 
>> Yes I think so. You are changing the meaning of ID from implicitely
>> "verified ID" to potentially "unverified ID". I think that is wrong.
>
> But what prevent you from throwing away ID content in this case,
> as you know that it is unauthenticated (you may even not to log it), and 
> allow user to connect? User has already exposed the
> content of ID, the damage (if any) has already occured,
> so what you will you protect by rejecting the connection?

Making the problem visible to it will not happen in the future.

Paul