[IPsec] Updating IPsec algorithm requirements

[David McGrew <[e-mail]>]

Hi Paul, Yaron, and IPsec ME WG participants,

I would like to propose an update to the algorithm requirements, as  
outlined below.

regards,

David

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Updating IPsec Algorithm Requirements

AES in Galois/Counter Mode of operation (AES-GCM)[RFC4106][RFC4543]
[RFC5282] should be recommended or required by the IPsec standards,
because it provides higher efficiency than currently recommended
algorithms with equivalent security, and is recommended by newer IPsec
profiles [RFC4869].

Currently, AES in Counter Mode (AES-CTR)[RFC3686] is recommended as a
SHOULD in "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)",
RFC 4835.  AES-CTR is a useful algorithm because it admits efficient
high speed implementations.  However, it provides no authentication.
 From RFC3686: "With AES-CTR, it is trivial to use a valid ciphertext
to forge other (valid to the decryptor) ciphertexts. Thus, it is
equally catastrophic to use AES-CTR without a companion authentication
function. Implementations MUST use AES-CTR in conjunction with an
authentication function, such as HMAC-SHA-1-96 [HMAC-SHA]."
Unfortunately, none of the authentication algorithms currently defined
for IPsec (HMAC, XCBC-MAC) admit efficient high speed
implementations.  Thus the need for authentication undermines the
efficiency of AES-CTR.

AES-GCM was designed specifically to overcome this problem.  It is a
"combined mode" in the ESP sense [RFC4303], that provides both
encryption and authentication.  Internally, it combines AES-CTR with
an authentication mechanism that can be efficiently implemented at
high data rates.

At the time that RFC 4835 was published (April 2007), there was not
yet a stable normative reference for AES-GCM.  This may have motivated
the IPsec community to not rely on that algorithm in its
recommendations.  But November 2007 saw the publication of NIST SP
800-38D, "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/
Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", which removes any such concern.  An
additional change in favor of AES-GCM is its wide adoption by
crypto hardware and software suppliers.

It is especially important that AES-GCM be recommended over the use of
AES-CTR with HMAC-SHA-256, because the latter combination of
algorithms is considerably less efficient, and the former algorithm
meets the security requirements.  The IPsec ME Working Group should
set a policy that makes it clear that HMAC-SHA-256 is not required for
future implementations.  HMAC-SHA-1 is believed to be secure (recall
the "No Need for SHA-2" Open Letter
http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-ipsec/02.ipsec/msg01840.html), but as the
industry moves away from SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256 may be the first algorithm
that comes to mind for some users of IPsec.  Thus a policy
clarification by the WG is essential.  This should be done as soon
as is practical, because the transition away from SHA-1 for digital
signatures is already underway; many users plan to have that transition
completed by the end of 2010 (see NIST SP 800-107, for example).

AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA1 are valuable because those algorithms are widely
implemented.  This suggests that it makes sense to rely on those
algorithms as mandatory-to-implement until such time as it becomes
necessary or desirable to stop using HMAC-SHA1.   AES-GCM should
replace this combination of algorithms, when that time comes.