Re: [IPsec] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-10: (with COMMENT)

Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru> Wed, 30 November 2022 08:06 UTC

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From: Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru>
To: 'Erik Kline' <ek.ietf@gmail.com>, 'The IESG' <iesg@ietf.org>
CC: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke@ietf.org, ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org, ipsec@ietf.org, kivinen@iki.fi
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-10: (with COMMENT)
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Hi Erik,

thank you for your comments. Please see inline.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Erik Kline via Datatracker [mailto:noreply@ietf.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2022 6:16 AM
> To: The IESG
> Cc: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke@ietf.org; ipsecme-chairs@ietf.org; ipsec@ietf.org;
> kivinen@iki.fi; kivinen@iki.fi
> Subject: Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-10: (with COMMENT)
> 
> Erik Kline has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-10: No Objection
> 
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> 
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke/
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> # Internet AD comments for draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-multiple-ke-10
> CC @ekline
> 
> ## Nits
> 
> ### S2
> 
> * s/FIPS complaint/FIPS compliant/

Funny typo :-) Fixed, thank you.

> ### S3.2.1
> 
> * I take it that it's not relevant to the example flow that there is no
>   transform called AKE4.  :-)

This was done on purpose, to illustrate the text in the para above:

   The initiator MAY propose non-consecutive Additional Key Exchange
   transforms, for example proposing Additional Key Exchange 2 and
   Additional Key Exchange 5 transforms only.

> ### S5
> 
> * "can dwarfed"?

This has been  already changed to:

    Simply increasing the key length can mitigate this attack.

by request from Sean.

The updated PR is available at:
https://github.com/post-quantum/ietf-pq-ikev2/pull/22

Regards,
Valery.