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Re: [IPsec] draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt-01

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Tue, 16 July 2019 21:39 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2019 17:39:16 -0400
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To: Sandeep Kampati <sandeepkampati@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt-01
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> On Jul 16, 2019, at 06:02, Sandeep Kampati <sandeepkampati@huawei.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> If we send more number of cryptographic suits the percentage of saving will increase 

But for a rekey, the initiator could just send the currently used negotiated transforms. It knows these are accepted / favoured. If for some reason the currently used transforms are no longer accepted, it could do a new initial exchange after the rekey failed, or another rekey attempt with more ciphers.
So the gain should not be measured against the 120 transforms.


> Most if deployment scenario what I observed is initiator is sending at least 5 cryptographic suits, in some deployment scenarios they are sending 120 cryptographic suites

Strongswan is known to send everything it got. Which is a giant amount. With debugging enabled, the entire code was so slow the exchange timed out. We had to rewrite proposal parser to be smarter.

But I only expect such a large set on the initial exchanges - not on rekeys.

Paul

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