[IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigating privacy concerns
Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi> Fri, 16 February 2018 18:13 UTC
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Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2018 20:13:20 +0200
From: Tero Kivinen <kivinen@iki.fi>
To: ipsec@ietf.org
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Subject: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigating privacy concerns
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This item does not have charter text yet, we do have text which explains what the problem is, but I think it requires some reformatting to fit as charter text. The problem description is: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- IKEv2 is currently vulnerable to the two following privacy concerns: 1) It's not possible to run a server that obfuscates IKEv2/IPsec using TLS. Today thanks to RFC 8229 it is possible to run an IKEv2/IPsec server on TCP port 443 with TLS. However if a government agent tries to send an SA_INIT over that it will discover that this server runs IKEv2/IPsec, and may blacklist it. We should add a mechanism to IKEv2 that allows the server to only respond to SA_INIT from known entities (e.g. that possess a shared secret). 2) The privacy of the initiator's identity in the presence of a man in the middle attacker is not protected. Today an attacker with full control of the network can receive the IDi/IDr sent by the initiator in the first AUTH packet. We should add a mechanism to IKEv2 that allows the initiator to only send IDi/IDr to known entities (e.g. that possess a shared secret). ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Is this something that we should add to charter? Do people understand the issue? Note, that there are multiple ways of solving these issues, for example the 2nd problem can also be solved by using pseudonyms, i.e., sending random one use ID payloads during the IKE_AUTH, and after the peers have authenticated each other, they can do new exchange which will change the pseudonyms for next use. I think the 2nd option should be rewritten in bit more generic ways to allow that kind of option too. Send your comments and whether you support adding this to the charter to the ipsec list in next two weeks. -- kivinen@iki.fi
- Re: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigat… Yoav Nir
- [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigating … Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigat… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigat… Yoav Nir
- Re: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigat… David Schinazi
- Re: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigat… Paul Wouters
- Re: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigat… Tero Kivinen
- Re: [IPsec] Additional charter items 4/4: Mitigat… Tommy Pauly